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Abstract: This dissertation examines the relationship between three sets of variables: 
corporate governance and monitoring, the quality of disclosure in annual reports and 
securities class action litigation. In the first section, I present a game-theoretic model in 
which shareholders select from ex ante monitoring or ex post litigation mechanisms 
available to them in order to mitigate the agency problem. Firm characteristics determine 
the choice of which of these two mechanisms is appropriate for a particular company. I 
then test predictions from this model and find that firms with poor monitoring are much 
more likely than those with good monitoring to be sued even after controlling for the 
common determinants of a lawsuit. The second section of the dissertation relates the 
quality of disclosure in annual reports to litigation. I use a dataset containing annual 
reports filed electronically with the SEC in the period 1996-2005. Using two content 
analysis software programs that analyze the categories of words used in these annual 
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reports, I find that firms that use more numbers, past and future words, and other 
informative words are much less likely to be sued, even after controlling for the common 
determinants of lawsuits. In order to avoid subjectively choosing categories, I use 
principal components analysis to identify the major components of annual report 
disclosure. When these components are used as regressors to identify causative factors of 
lawsuits, one component named ‘informativeness’ has significant power to explain 
subsequent lawsuits. In head-to-head comparisons of the ‘informativeness’ principal 
component with Standard & Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure score, my 
informativeness measure is more effective than the S&P score in predicting the likelihood 
of a lawsuit. Finally, in cross-sectional tests, I find support for the theory that firms with 
good boards and managers who are not entrenched have better disclosure practices. 
Further, monitoring by institutional investors, independent boards and analysts appears to 
induce better corporate disclosure.  
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
Ex ante monitoring and ex post litigation as substitutes 
The primary goal of corporate governance and monitoring is to solve the agency 
problem that arises when ownership is separated from management, and to assure 
investors a return on their investment. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have noted, “People 
who sink the capital need to be assured that they get back the return on this capital. 
Corporate governance mechanisms provide this assurance.” With increasing instances in 
the last few years of corporate wrongdoing and managerial fraud, corporate governance 
mechanisms have gained more importance and media attention than ever before. Previous 
research on corporate governance has examined several ways in which managerial 
incentives can be aligned so as to prevent fraudulent practices, including earnings 
manipulation, outsider-dominated boards, incentive-based compensation and monitoring 
by institutional shareholders and blockholders.  
Securities Class Action litigation is another means available to small investors to 
enforce their rights against managers. Securities Class Action lawsuits are initiated by 
one or more shareholders representing a larger group (the “class”) of shareholders who 
suffered losses caused by managerial actions. These lawsuits generally involve 
allegations that managers have engaged in some type of malfeasance such as 
disseminating false or misleading information, insider trading or earnings manipulation 
with the result that shareholders have suffered erosion in the market value of their shares.  
With the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, securities class actions 
have played an increasing role in disciplining managers. Both the number of cases and 
2the amounts of settlements have increased dramatically in the last 7 or 8 years.1 Not only 
do the companies pay a price on losing a lawsuit, but the management also faces stringent 
consequences. Niehaus and Roth (1999) and Strahan (1998) both show that CEO 
turnover increases after securities class action suits, and this effect is stronger after a 
shareholder victory. Fich and Shivdasani (2004) show that fraud and subsequent lawsuits 
result in reputational penalties for directors as well. Subsequent to the revelation of fraud, 
directors on the boards of the fraudulent firms have lost their directorships not only in 
those firms, but other firms as well.  
Since Securities Class Action (SCA) suits impose strict consequences upon 
discovery of manipulation and fraud, it is clear that securities litigation is one of many 
corporate governance mechanisms that monitor and discipline managers. In this paper, I 
model and test the prediction that Securities Class Actions are an ex post substitute to ex 
ante monitoring as a means of keeping management in check and preventing fraudulent 
practices. Hence SCAs should come into force especially in those firms in which the 
other controls are absent or ineffective – namely, in firms that have poor monitoring 
mechanisms in place. This is the unique contribution of this paper to the literature. 
The theoretical model in Chapter 2 characterizes the decision of shareholders who 
have two mechanisms available to them: ex ante monitoring and ex post litigation. If 
shareholders choose a high level of ex ante monitoring, it reduces managerial opportunity 
to commit fraud. Alternatively, the threat of ex post litigation works by discouraging 
managerial malfeasance. In equilibrium, these two mechanisms are found to be 
substitutes. The optimal choice for a firm’s shareholders depends on i) the cost of 
1 Large settlements in the past few years include Cendant Corporation ($2.85 billion), Waste Management Corp. ($220 
million), 3Com ($259 million), Rite-Aid ($200 million), Informix ($159 million) and Prison Realty ($110 million). 
3monitoring for that particular firm and ii) the ease of ex ante monitoring as opposed to the 
challenge of proving a charge of fraud in the courts. Comparative statics from the 
theoretical model give rise to the testable proposition that monitoring by institutional 
blockholders or boards can be a substitute to litigation. Monitoring of managers is easier 
in firms with large institutional blockholders or outsider-dominated boards and hence 
these firms depend less on litigation. Additional comparative statics of the model identify 
other factors that are likely to determine which of the two is chosen by a company. First, 
shareholders of firms with entrenched managers find it harder to monitor, and therefore 
depend heavily on litigation. Second, shareholders of extremely large and complex firms 
find it harder to monitor their managers and hence depend more on litigation. 
To test the predictions of this model, I first examine whether litigation is a 
substitute to monitoring by three different parties frequently known to act as monitors, 
independent directors on the board of a company, institutional blockholders ( institutional 
investors holding 5% or more of the shares of a company), and analysts. The results 
suggest that firms tend to choose one of either litigation or internal monitoring (by boards 
or institutional investors), consistent with their being substitutes. This is not the case with 
analyst monitoring, as firms that have a large analyst following are not significantly less 
likely to face a securities class action lawsuit, after controlling for size and other 
determinants of lawsuits. However, firms with one or more large institutional 
blockholders, or firms with a high proportion of independent directors on their boards are 
less likely to face a lawsuit. I also examine the choice between monitoring and litigation 
for different types of firms. Consistent with the hypothesis that litigation is preferred to 
monitoring for companies with entrenched managers, I find that firms with high CEO 
4compensation and incentive pay (both absolute and adjusted), as well as firms with lower 
dividend yield are more likely to face class action lawsuits.  
A key decision for shareholders who choose to rely on litigation instead of 
monitoring as a control is the decision of when to sue. One event that could arouse 
shareholders’ suspicions of managerial wrongdoing is an earnings restatement. Well-
documented evidence exists that managers sometimes falsely represent earnings to be 
higher than they are, resulting in inflated share prices. On subsequent discovery of the 
manipulation, earnings are restated causing a steep drop in stock price.2
However, restatements can also be caused by a change in accounting practices or 
genuine errors that are identified and corrected. Ex post, it is difficult to accurately 
distinguish benign restatements from those due to intentional mis-statements. Hence, 
upon observing a restatement in my model, a shareholder gives companies with good ex 
ante monitoring mechanisms the benefit of the doubt, and is more likely to sue companies 
with poor existing monitoring mechanisms. If a strongly monitored company restates its 
financials, shareholders are more likely to attribute it to a genuine error. This is consistent 
with the model in which, if shareholders decide to monitor ex ante, they drastically 
reduce the manager’s opportunity of committing fraud and the probability of then 
observing a restatement. Of course, strong controls are costlier to maintain; if 
shareholders instead choose to ‘wait and see’ without monitoring, they are more likely to 
 
2 An abundance of literature exists on the negative stock price reactions to (and
the consequent losses to shareholders arising from) earnings restatements. Recent studies
include Owens, Lin and Rogers (2002), Wu (2002), GAO (2002), Moriarty and
Livingston (2001) and Palmrose et al. (2002). As pointed out by Palmrose, Richardson
and Scholz (2001), a restatement can trigger an SEC investigation, lead to replacement of
top executives, and result in the firm being significantly penalized by investors.
5sue if they see a restatement or a sharp price drop, because this event is more likely to be 
a sign of mismanagement for a company with poor corporate governance systems.  
The importance that shareholders give to accurate earnings statements highlights 
the importance of accurate and timely managerial communication with shareholders. The 
next section describes an analysis of the quality of disclosure in managerial 
communications with shareholders.  
Using disclosure quality to predict litigation 
Corporate disclosure plays an integral role in alleviating the problem of 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders in a firm. It is the means by 
which managers communicate information both relating to past events and future growth 
prospects of a firm. As such, this information flow forms the lifeblood of any capital 
market. Developing a precise metric for the quality of disclosure by a company would be 
beneficial because it sets a standard for measuring the openness and accuracy of 
communications by the management of a company. In this section, I outline a study that 
analyzes the 10-K filings of firms in order to develop a measure of the informativeness of 
the communications by a firm.  
My measure for the quality of disclosure differs from previous studies that have 
relied upon an analysis of the accounting information in these documents. Instead, I 
analyze the types of words used in these documents. Several studies in the psychology 
area have documented that the usage of certain types of words can be related to attributes 
like transparency and open communication. Along these lines, I use content analysis 
software programs to assess the quality of disclosure in these filings. I also relate this 
measure to the likelihood of a securities class action lawsuit, arguing that these lawsuits 
6exemplify poor disclosure practices that are rejected by investors. These software 
programs have built-in dictionaries and wordlists that are used to classify the words in 
documents they read. Using the results from content analysis software programs, I find 
that firms that disclose less information about past and future corporate events, and 
present less numerical data are more likely to be subsequently sued. However, these firms 
do not have unusual amounts of positive or negative words, or optimistic or pessimistic 
words.  I also use principal components analysis of the more than 200 word categories in 
the content analysis packages in order to determine the combinations of word types that 
are most likely to trigger a lawsuit. The result of this analysis is an ‘informativeness’
component that is found to be inversely related to the risk of a lawsuit (and hence to poor 
disclosure practices). I also compare the efficacy of this informativeness component in 
predicting lawsuits against another measure of disclosure, the S&P Transparency and 
Disclosure rank. In head-to-head tests, I find that the informativeness component is a 
better measure of securities litigation risk compared to the S&P rankings based on annual 
reports and on the entire spectrum of corporate transparency. 
Finally, I examine the determinants of good disclosure as measured by the 
informativeness of 10-K filings of a company. I examine whether good governance 
practices influence good disclosure practices, by regressing the informativeness 
component on governance measures including board size and structure, the number of 
antitakeover provisions and executive compensation measures among others. Results 
from this test show that firms with strong governance as measured by these structures 
have better disclosure. In other words, firms with independent boards and less entrenched 
7CEOs have better disclosure practices. I do not find strong evidence that the size and 
composition of the CEO pay package is related to the quality of disclosure by a firm.  
I also examine the relationship between informative disclosure practices and 
monitoring by institutional investors and analysts. I try to resolve the causality in this 
relationship which is ambiguous. Good disclosure practices might attract institutional 
investors and analysts to a stock; alternatively, when a large number of institutions and 
analysts have a stake in a company, they may enforce better disclosure. I address this 
issue of causality using an instrumental variable approach, and instrument for 
institutional holdings and analyst coverage using membership in the S&P500 index and 
other indices, and share turnover. Using this approach, I find that firms with a higher 
proportion of shares held by institutional investors, or firms with at least one institutional 
blockholder tend to have a better quality of disclosure in their 10-K filings. I find limited 
evidence to indicate that firms that are followed by more analysts also tend to have better 
disclosure practices. 
This work draws upon and links a number of threads in the accounting 
manipulation, securities law and corporate governance literature. Chapter 2 describes the 
existing literature in the areas of securities litigation, fraud, disclosure and governance 
and lists the contributions of this dissertation to the literature. Chapter 3 outlines a 
theoretical model which models shareholders’ choice of ex ante and ex post measures of 
monitoring managers’ actions. Chapter 4 details the empirical analysis that tests the 
predictions of the model. Chapter 5 describes the use of disclosure quality measures in 
order to predict securities litigation. Chapter 6 examines whether common corporate 
8governance and monitoring mechanisms are determinants of disclosure quality and the 
last section concludes.  
 
9Chapter 2: Literature Review  
Governance, Disclosure and Litigation Risk 
Securities Class Action Litigation 
Introduction to securities class action litigation 
The literature on securities class action litigation can broadly be classified into 
descriptive literature and analytical studies. Several descriptive papers analyze the types 
of securities lawsuits, the main allegations, and the time trends of settlements3 and 
dismissals. Bajaj, Mazumdar and Sarin (2000) and others document the increasing time 
trend in securities class action litigation. Among the analytical studies, a set of papers 
examines stock market reactions to litigation announcements. Gande and Lewis (2006), a 
recent paper that looks at this issue, confirms previously reported negative stock price 
reactions to shareholder initiated class action lawsuits, on the announcement date, but 
contends that filing date effects understate the magnitude of shareholder losses because 
shareholders partially anticipate these lawsuits and capitalize part of these losses prior to 
a lawsuit filing date. Another group of papers examines the efficacy of legal reform in 
preventing non-meritorious lawsuits from coming to trial and issuing valid judgments to 
meritorious lawsuits.  
3 Cornerstone Research publishes securities class action litigation summaries annually,
describing the kinds of lawsuits, main allegations and settlements. NERA also publishes a
similar review. Other descriptive papers are Carleton, Weisbach and Weiss (1996) and
Bajaj, Mazumdar and Sarin (2000).
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Several papers also document that the Public Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA) increased the significance of certain merit-related factors, such as the presence 
of an accounting restatement, in determining the incidence and outcomes of securities 
fraud class actions. Choi (2005) takes a closer look at this issue by evaluating whether 
this documented increase in the importance of merit-related factors post-PSLRA has 
reduced the incidence of both nuisance litigation as well as some meritorious claims. The 
essay provides evidence that the pre-PSLRA non-nuisance claims lacking obvious “hard 
evidence” indicative of fraud (an accounting restatement or SEC action) face both a 
lower probability of suit in the post-PSLRA period and a greater likelihood of receiving a 
dismissal or low-value settlement in the post-PSLRA period.  
Accounting restatements and litigation 
Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2002) find that restating firms have higher ex ante 
financing needs, large total accruals, higher P/E and M/B ratios. Agrawal and Chadha 
(2005) do not find a strong relationship between the probability of restatement and 
different measures of board and auditor independence. A few recent papers have 
examined the connection between restatements and litigation. Palmrose and Scholz 
(2004) ask the same questions as I do in evaluating why some restatements are more 
likely to be followed by litigation than others. However, they do not take into 
consideration agency problems or other corporate governance controls. Their hypothesis 
deals with features of the restatement itself (pervasiveness, core elements or non-core 
elements of the financial statements that are restated) that determines whether a 
restatement results in litigation or not. One caveat with this approach is that it is often 
hard to distinguish exact features of a restatement from a Lexis-Nexis news report. 
11
Though most reports carry the date of the announcement, the period for which financial 
statements are restated and the effect on net income or earnings per share, it often 
requires plenty of skill and an in-depth knowledge of accounting for an investor to look 
beyond these and assess how pervasive the restatement is.  
Agency problems and litigation 
In the litigation literature, Niehaus and Roth (1999) look at various measures in 
order to decide whether securities class actions have merit or are just instigated by self-
serving lawyers. They conclude that in several of the litigated firms, managers had 
incentives for delayed disclosure of negative earnings news and that securities class 
actions on average do have justification. Strahan (1998) tests (and concludes) that firms 
prone to agency problems are more likely to face securities class actions. However 
Strahan does not control for earnings manipulation which is the link between agency 
problems and litigation. Agency problems make firms more vulnerable to earnings 
manipulation by self-serving managers, and firms that manipulate earnings are more 
likely to be sued.  
Other factors affecting litigation 
Jones and Weingram (1998) analyze the effects of five factors on the likelihood of 
a company being subject to a lawsuit under Sec. 10b-5 (securities lawsuit) after a major 
single-day stock price decline: insider trading, seasoned equity offerings, accounting 
restatements, SEC enforcement actions, and fall-triggering announcements. They 
investigate the incremental impact of each factor after controlling for stock market 
characteristics that influence litigation risk. They find that insider sales do not increase 
12
litigation risk. Issuing equity also does not have a significant impact on a corporation's 
likelihood of being a target of this type of litigation. However, the type of announcement 
that accompanies the single-day fall influences the likelihood of litigation. Firms that 
correct previous accounting statements and those that are subject to SEC enforcement 
actions are substantially more likely to be sued than other firms. 
Consequences of litigation 
The financial consequences of litigation can be enormous, as can be seen from the 
experiences of prominent companies in the news lately. Some examples of securities 
lawsuits with extremely large settlements are Bank of America (490 million), 3Com (259 
million), Waste Management (457 million), Qwest Corporation (250 million), 
MCI/WorldCom (750 million) and Cendant Corporation (2.85 billion). The non-
monetary consequences of securities litigation have also been substantial. Both Niehaus 
and Roth (1999) and Strahan (1998) find increased managerial turnover after a lawsuit. 
Fich and Shivdasani (2004) report that outside directors tend to lose their directorships 
following a lawsuit. These and other consequences of fraud (whether followed by 
litigation or not) are discussed in the section entitled “Consequences of accounting 
manipulation and fraud”.  
Accounting Manipulation and Fraud 
Managerial incentives to commit accounting manipulation and fraud 
One of the seminal papers that examined factors predicting earnings management 
was Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). This paper uses discretionary accruals-based 
models to successfully predict earnings management and SEC fraud. Dechow, Sloan and 
13
Sweeney (1996) examine the causes and consequences of earnings manipulation by 
analyzing a sample of firms that were subject to SEC enforcement actions. They find that 
firms manipulating earnings are: (i) more likely to have boards of directors dominated by 
management; (ii) more likely to have a CEO who simultaneously serves as Chairman of 
the Board; (iii) more likely to have a CEO who is also the firm's founder; (iv) less likely 
to have an audit committee; and (v) less likely to have an outside blockholder. They also 
find that an important motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to attract 
external financing at low cost. 
Beneish (1999) and Kedia (2003) argue that stock options generate incentives to 
manipulate earnings.4 Other papers that associate high or incentive-based CEO pay with 
earnings management and manipulation are Peng and Roell (2004), Richardson, Tuna 
and Wu (2002) and Wu (2002). Summers and Sweeney (1998) also concludes that 
managers who perpetrate fraud tend to sell their stakes in the company and benefit from 
the stock price manipulation. 
Consequences of accounting manipulation and fraud 
Desai, Hogan and Wilkins (2006) examine management turnover and the 
subsequent re-hiring of displaced managers at firms announcing earnings restatements 
during 1997 or 1998. In contrast to prior research5 which does not find increased turnover 
following GAAP violations or revelation of corporate fraud, they find that 60% of 
restating firms experience a turnover in at least one top manager within 24 months of the 
restatement compared to only 35% among age-, size- and industry-matched firms.  
 
4 This conclusion finds support in many other studies including Kedia (2003) and Denis,
Hanouna and Sarin (2005).
5 Beneish (1999) and Agrawal, Jaffe and Karpoff (1999)
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Moreover, 85% of the displaced managers of restatement firms are unable to 
secure comparable employment afterwards. This conclusion is supported by Livingston 
(1996), who finds that after controlling for firm performance and financial distress, top 
managers and financial officers are more likely to be dismissed in the years following 
misleading reporting than in other years. For top executives, SEC enforcement action is 
associated with a higher frequency of turnover. 
Cox and Thomas (2003) examine the relationship between SEC enforcement 
actions for fraud and private securities litigation by shareholders. Their findings include 
the following: i) private suits with parallel SEC actions settle for significantly more than 
private suits without such proceedings; ii) SEC enforcement actions target significantly 
smaller companies than private actions alone; iii) private cases with parallel SEC actions 
take substantially less time to settle than other private cases; and iv) private cases with 
parallel SEC actions have significantly longer class periods than other private actions. In 
addition, they have the important result that financial distress is the single most important 
determinant of SEC actions whereas expected losses are not a significant determinant of 
these actions. 
Feroz, Park and Pastena (1991) examine the consequences of an SEC Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) on the firm’s managers, auditors and market 
participants. AAERs are SEC civil actions taken against firms which violate accounting 
rules, most commonly by overstatements of accounts receivable and inventories resulting 
from premature revenue recognition and delayed write-offs respectively. Consistent with 
prior research, they find that the announcement of an SEC AAER results in a significant 
15
negative abnormal return. The AAER is also accompanied by specific SEC censures to 
the external auditor of the firm regarding particular accounting issues. 
The penalties to both managers and directors of fraud and subsequent litigation 
are stringent. Fich and Shivdasani (2004) have the interesting result that upon revelation 
of fraud, outside directors are less likely to retain their directorships of both fraud and 
non-fraud firms. Hence fraud and litigation imposes penalties not only on the company 
and its management, but also upon its directors. 
Disclosure Quality 
Measures of disclosure quality 
Among the disclosure or “quality of information” proxies suggested in the 
literature are accounting-based measures and managerial communication-based measures. 
Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2005) use accruals quality (a measure of how well accruals 
map into cash flows) as a measure of information quality. This measure is found to be 
closely correlated with the expansiveness of voluntary information disclosure by the firm. 
They use this accruals quality proxy to investigate the relationship between information 
quality and cost of capital, and find that greater voluntary disclosure is associated with 
lower costs of debt and equity capital.  
A second set of papers develop measures of voluntary disclosure based on public 
statements and announcements by management. Tasker (1998) uses the number of 
conference calls that provide open access to all investors as a proxy for disclosure 
quality. Kasznik and Lev (1995) examine whether firms provide early warnings of bad 
news before previously scheduled earnings announcements. Early warning by firms of 
16
bad earnings news is considered to be good disclosure policy. Kasznik (1999) follows a 
different approach by examining the accuracy of earnings forecasts by management. 
Accurate earnings forecasts are treated as a measure of good voluntary disclosure. 
Waymire (1985), Cox (1985) and Imhoff (1978) are other studies that use management 
forecasts of earnings as a proxy for voluntary disclosure.  
Another set of papers in this field polls outsiders such as analysts to determine 
their ratings of the company’s disclosure policies. The papers that fall into this category 
include Brown, Finn and Hillegeist (2000) and Lang and Lundholm (1993). Brown et al. 
(2000) use AIMR score, a rating by the association of analysts as a proxy for voluntary 
disclosure. However this score is available only until 1995 because AIMR discontinued 
its ranking. Lang and Lundholm (1993) also use analysts’ rating of corporate disclosure 
informativeness from the 1985-1989 FAF reports. Finally, Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara 
(2002) adopt a slightly different method by using an index denoted as PIN, or the 
probability of informed trading as a proxy for information asymmetry. They find that a 
difference of 10 percentage points in the probability of information-based trading 
between two stocks leads to a difference in their expected returns of 2.5% per year. They 
interpret their results as providing strong support for the premise that information affects 
asset pricing fundamentals. 
Standard and Poor’s introduced their Transparency and Disclosure (T&D) ranks 
in 2002.6 The ranking procedure involved analyzing 98 disclosure items in three 
categories: ownership structure and investor rights, financial transparency and 
information disclosure, and board and management structure and process. The S&P 
6 The ranks and ranking procedures are described in the S&P paper by Patel and Dallas
(2002).
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disclosure rank is based on 35 accounting items, 35 governance structures and 28 
ownership structures. The ranks, initially awarded to US companies alone, were later 
extended to include companies in emerging markets including Latin America and Asia. 
Both the original study by Patel and Dallas (2002) and other subsequent studies examine 
the relationship between these S&P ranks and market risk and find a negative relationship 
between the two. Independently, Cheng, Collins and Huang (2003) concluded that the 
S&P T&D rankings did provide new information to the markets along various 
dimensions, and that firms with large differences in disclosure levels in SEC filings over 
time were received unfavorably by investors.  
Finally, Botosan (1997) compares different disclosure scores and constructs one 
of her own. This score uses information from annual reports of 122 companies and is 
based on background information of the company, historical results, key non-financial 
statistics (e.g. number of employees, market share), forecasted information and MD&A. 
The drawback of this score is that it is only available for a limited number of companies 
and at one point in time. Thus it does not allow comparisons across time, and allows only 
limited comparisons of disclosure across firms. Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2005) build 
on Botosan (1997) by constructing their own score which leaves out MD&A and 
background information “because disclosure in these categories is substantially 
constrained by SEC rules” and removing these categories captures voluntary disclosure. 
They also add a category of other financial information.  
Factors affecting disclosure quality 
Healy and Palepu (2001) provide a comprehensive review of factors affecting the 
quality of disclosure as measured by the decision to manage earnings. They discuss both 
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theoretical and empirical results for six factors that may affect managers’ disclosure 
decisions: other than the threat of litigation discussed in the next section, they also 
examine capital market transactions, corporate control contests, stock compensation, 
proprietary costs, and management talent signaling. Theoretical as well as empirical 
evidence suggests that managers improve their disclosure decisions prior to capital 
market transactions, in order to avoid hostile takeovers and to reduce the likelihood of 
undervaluation and explain away poor earnings performance. Managers’ compensation 
plans also provide incentives to engage in voluntary disclosure in order to increase stock 
liquidity, reveal private information and meet insider trading guidelines. Disclosure 
decisions are also affected by concerns about revealing firm-specific information in a 
competitive market and signaling managers’ superior ability to anticipate future changes. 
In contrast, Nagar (1999) characterizes disclosure as a function of the manager’s human 
capital. According to Nagar (1999), a firm’s earnings are a function of the assets in place 
in the firm and the manager’s human capital. Disclosure of the earnings by the manager 
may result in a reassessment of his human capital by the market, possibly affecting his 
future earnings potential. A manager who is less risk-averse or paid to disclose 
information is more likely to volunteer disclosure.  
Wright (1996) examines the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and the quality of reporting in financial statements. This paper documents 
significant correlations between various financial reporting quality measures and board 
composition. The quality of financial reporting is found to be negatively related to the 
presence of insiders and grey directors on the audit committee. The two financial 
reporting quality measures evaluated are (1) analysts' evaluations of corporate disclosure 
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practices and (2) the existence of an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release 
against the firm or its auditors. Moreover, the percentage of insider or grey audit 
committee members is significantly related to the percentage of stock owned by large 
shareholders and institutions. This suggests that the role of the audit committee as a 
monitor of financial reporting practices depends on firm ownership characteristics.  
Lang and Lundholm (1996) analyze disclosures specifically for firms that make 
equity offerings and find that there is a significant increase in disclosure beginning six 
months before the offering, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms 
have the most discretion. This finding adds to the result in Lang and Lundholm (1993) 
that firms with more informative disclosures have larger analyst following, less 
dispersion in analyst forecasts, and less volatility in forecast revisions. 
Disclosure quality and litigation 
Healy and Palepu (2001) summarize both the theoretical and empirical literature 
relating disclosure and litigation. Theoretically, it is unclear whether the threat of 
litigation will lead to improved voluntary disclosure or reduce incentive to disclose 
forward-looking information. Skinner (1994, 1997) finds that firms with bad earnings 
news are more likely to voluntarily disclose their earnings performance compared to 
firms with good news. Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994) find that 62% of the firms 
in their litigation sample were sued over earnings forecasts or pre-emptive earnings 
disclosures. 87% of their sample of no-litigation firms with comparable stock price 
declines pre-announced an earnings decline. They conclude that disclosure does not 
appear to be a deterrent to litigation. 
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The prior literature has established that a negative earnings report often results in 
litigation; however there is no consensus on the effect of early disclosure of bad news. 
Lev (1992) and Skinner (1994) contend that disclosing negative earnings early (prior to 
regularly scheduled earnings releases) softens the blow and reduces the likelihood of 
litigation; whereas others such as Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994) argue that early 
disclosure increases the probability of a lawsuit. Field, Lowry and Shu (2005) try to 
resolve this confusing relationship between disclosure and litigation by asking whether 
disclosure deters or triggers litigation. By using the simultaneous equations method to 
control for the endogeneity of disclosure and litigation, they find no evidence to indicate 
that early disclosure triggers litigation. In fact, they find some evidence that early 
disclosure of negative news may reduce the possibility of litigation.  
Kasznik (1999) in an innovative study examines whether disclosure influences 
earnings management. The study finds that managers try to reduce the reputational and 
legal consequences they may face after management earnings forecast errors by using 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward.  A consistent finding is that managers 
use discretionary accruals more in the “post forecast” periods than “pre forecast” periods.  
Disclosure quality and corporate governance 
Fox (1999) proposes a hitherto unrecognized effect of enforced disclosure policies 
by arguing that required disclosure helps shareholders enforce managers’ fiduciary 
duties. Other than the direct impact of making managers accountable for their publicly 
available decisions, enforced disclosure also indirectly affects corporate governance by 
affecting the market for corporate control, the cost of capital, and monitoring by external 
sources of finance.  
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Agency costs and monitoring 
Institutional investors as monitors 
Demsetz (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) were the earliest to propose that 
the existence of large shareholders will lead to better monitoring of managers. Several 
papers have since empirically examined whether institutional investors play a monitoring 
role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Institutional 
investors influence managerial decisions, and hence play a monitoring role, both actively 
influencing managerial decisions in various spheres, and passively by selectively buying 
shares in companies with desirable characteristics. According to Gillan and Starks (2000) 
institutional investors such as public pension funds began to get actively involved in 
corporate governance by submitting shareholder proxy proposals as early as 1986. They 
test if institutional shareholder activism is viewed favorably by investors by examining 
the relationship between proposal voting patterns and sponsor identity. The test finds that 
on average, proposals sponsored by institutions get 175% as many votes as those 
sponsored by individual shareholders.  
Other papers have found that institutional shareholders influence managerial pay 
and business decisions. Hartzell and Starks (2003) find evidence that institutional 
ownership concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of 
executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, suggesting 
that institutions play a monitoring role. Other evidence suggests that institutions may 
have influence on business decisions. Bushee and Noe (2000) find that managers are less 
likely to cut R&D spending when institutional ownership is high, implying that 
institutional owners do not put pressures on managers to indulge in myopic behavior. 
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However a high proportion of ownership by institutions that have high portfolio turnover 
and engage in momentum trading increases the probability that managers will cut R&D 
spending to reverse an earnings decline.   
Clyde (1997) throws some light on the mechanism by which institutional owners 
influence the company’s operations. This paper finds that institutional owners were more 
likely in the 1980s to police management by using takeovers as the disciplining 
mechanism. Maug (1998) asks whether a liquid market results in less monitoring by 
institutional investors because of the ease with which they can dispose of their stock 
holdings. In fact, the findings are opposite: a liquid market actually enhances monitoring 
by institutional investors, because it mitigates the free rider problem and makes it easier 
for large shareholders to hold more shares. Hence liquidity in stock markets is conducive 
to monitoring by institutional investors. Large institutions like CalPERS involve 
themselves in promoting good corporate practices through activism. Smith (1996) studies 
51 firms targeted by CalPERS and finds that the majority of these adopt the changes 
proposed by CalPERS.  
 
Institutional investors in securities litigation 
Weiss and Beckerman (1995) take a litigation procedure-oriented approach to 
argue that institutional investors can reduce agency costs in securities lawsuits. They note 
that institutional investors have a large stake in class actions, since they are the recipient 
of a large proportion of the payouts. As such, they have an incentive to play an active role 
in securities litigation, and the legal system should encourage them to become “lead 
plaintiffs” in securities class action lawsuits. Doing so will benefit the plaintiffs by 
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increasing the proportion of the damages they receive, and at the same time alleviate 
concerns about their getting shortchanged by avaricious plaintiff lawyers. This paper was 
written before the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) came into effect, 
putting into place controls for reducing the number of ‘strike suits’ that come to trial. The 
PSLRA also made the litigation environment conducive to active institutional 
participation similar to the suggestions in Weiss and Beckerman.  
Johnson (1997) agrees that institutional investors have an important role to play in 
securities litigation; furthermore, that only institutional investors can fulfill both the roles 
that securities litigation requires: deterrence of future fraud and adequate compensation 
for investors who suffered as a result of current managerial fraud. Since these two aims 
may sometimes be in conflict, institutions are uniquely placed to enhance the deterrence 
function without undermining the compensation goal.  
Compensation and incentives 
Ke (2003), for example, finds that CEOs who hold more stock options and stocks 
are more likely to report longer strings of consecutive earnings increase, especially for 
firms whose stock prices are historically sensitive to earnings reports. A number of other 
studies contain similar findings. Johnson, Ryan & Tian (2003) find that executives at 
fraud firms have significantly larger equity-based compensation and greater financial 
incentives to commit fraud than do executives at industry- and size-matched control 
firms. Executives at fraud firms are also shown to benefit from fraud by exercising larger 
fractions of their vested options than executives in control firms during the fraud years. 
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My Contribution to the existing literature 
In this section I detail the various contributions my dissertation makes to the 
existing literature on different fronts. As this study spans different research areas 
including securities class action litigation, corporate disclosure and transparency, 
governance and monitoring, and fraud, I will list contributions in all these different areas.  
The securities class action literature is largely descriptive in nature. An important 
contribution of my dissertation in the litigation area is to treat litigation as one of the 
means available to shareholders to enforce their rights. As such, litigation is seen as an 
“ex post measure” and a substitute for other measures that work “ex ante” to align 
incentives and keep a check on managerial behavior. Prior literature examining litigation 
has tended to be in the law area and hence has examined litigation in isolation, and not as 
one of many complementary structures available to enforce shareholder rights. Similarly, 
the literature in corporate governance and agency theory has largely ignored litigation as 
another means available to the same end. I explicitly model this trade-off between ex ante 
measures like corporate governance and monitoring, and the ex post litigation method, 
and describe firm characteristics that may determine which of these different methods is 
suitable for a particular firm.  
The second significant contribution of this dissertation is in the area of corporate 
disclosure and transparency. Though there have been previous attempts to quantify the 
quality of disclosure in annual reports, these rankings or ratings are based on intensive 
human analyses of the reports that are hard to replicate. In addition these analyses may 
have a subjective aspect to them. Further, the existing rankings of disclosure and 
transparency are available only for specific companies in their sample, and only for 
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specific years. For example, the AIMR score used by Brown et al. (2000) among others is 
available only for a limited number of years, ending in 1995 because the rankings were 
discontinued at that time. Similarly, analysts’ ratings of informativeness of corporate 
disclosure, as studied by Lang and Lundholm (1993) and others, is also available only for 
the period from 1985 to 1989. The S&P Transparency and Disclosure Rank is the most 
widespread and detailed of these measures, incorporating information not only from the 
annual reports but also other filings. However this too is limited in scope as it has only 
been issued by the S&P for US companies once, in 2001. It is not clear how many years 
of data were studied in order to determine a company’s Transparency and Disclosure 
rank issued in 2001.  
In contrast to all these studies, my disclosure and transparency measure can be 
calculated for any company, in any year, using a standardized methodology that is 
programmable and easily replicable. The input data is the 10-K report that is freely 
available for download on the SEC’s website, and the content analysis software programs 
used in the analysis are also available for free download online. Secondly, and unlike 
other disclosure measures, I show that my measure of disclosure is strongly and 
significantly related to the likelihood of a lawsuit. Poor disclosure (based on an analysis 
of the types of words used in the 10-K document) is likely to lead to a lawsuit. Other 
measures of disclosure quality are not linked to objective external consequences such as 
litigation. Securities lawsuits can result in sizeable monetary consequences for the 
company, reputational penalties for the management and directors, and steep erosion in 
shareholder value. Hence my measure is not only easily calculated but also economically 
significant, as ‘poor’ disclosure has serious negative consequences.  
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The third significant contribution of this dissertation is analyzing the factors that 
might predict the quality of disclosure by a firm. There is little literature on the factors 
that pressure management to improve the quality of their disclosure. I examine whether 
strong governance and monitoring by institutions and analysts lead to informative 
disclosure on the part of the management of a company. I find evidence that independent 
boards, institutional blockholders and analyst following are associated with more 
informative disclosure levels. This gives us an insight into what steps can be taken in 
order to improve the informativeness and timeliness of corporate disclosure.  
Core (2001) summarized the existing disclosure literature and outlined 
suggestions for future work which coincidentally shed some light on the scope and 
contribution of this dissertation in the area of disclosure. The following is a passage from 
Core (2001)’s suggestions for future work:  
I conjecture that researchers can substantially lower the cost of computing these 
metrics by importing techniques in natural language processing from fields like 
computer science, linguistics, and artificial intelligence. An example of a 
widespread natural language processing technology is the grammar-checking 
device provided with many word- processing programs. This device provides 
information on the frequency of use of the passive tense. The passive tense (is) 
one of a number of linguistic devices for hiding meaning that are examined in 
the law and linguistics literature. These programs also provide other readability 
statistics... It seems worthwhile to investigate whether more sophisticated natural 
language processing technology could be used to replicate ratings by the AIMR 
and ratings by researchers. If this can be accomplished, it would significantly 
reduce the cost of creating disclosure quality indices from firm reports and press 
releases. Natural language processing programs could be also used to create 
proxies for the ‘‘tone’’ of disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 2001) and proxies for 
the precision and bias of the information that is conveyed. Healy and Palepu 
(1993, 2001) emphasize the important idea that managers communicate with 
investors. Managers use natural language for this communication, and we can 
advance work in accounting by using research from other fields to find ways to 
machine-code the precision of this language and any bias contained in it. 
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I quote this passage because it is a good description of the contribution of this 
research to the disclosure literature. The ‘natural language processing programs’, or 
content analysis programs, are particularly suited for examining the nature of managerial 
disclosures, and offer the added advantage of being programmable and automated. Thus 
the disclosure quality index I create can be easily and quickly computed from publicly 
available filings for thousands of companies and describes different facets of the annual 
report including optimism or pessimism, proportion of numerical information and 
forward-looking information etc. The use of this disclosure quality index to predict 
possible fraud and litigation represents a significant addition to the body of work that 
examines disclosure, in the finance, accounting and legal fields. The analysis of the 
determinants of informative disclosure can help investors create conditions in firms that 
are conducive to good disclosure by management. 
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Chapter 3
Ex Ante Monitoring or Ex Post Litigation? Theoretical Model
This section describes a theoretical model that characterizes the decision of a 
shareholder (or group of shareholders) of a company seeking to mitigate the manager-
shareholder agency problem. In addressing the potential problem of managerial fraud, 
shareholders have two mechanisms available to them. One option is to impose ex ante 
controls so that the manager’s opportunity to commit fraud is greatly reduced.  They may 
also choose to let the possibility of an ex post lawsuit act as a deterrent. I analyze 
shareholders’ choices under two different information assumptions. First, to provide a 
benchmark, I assume that there is perfect information, i.e. that managerial actions 
including fraud are visible to shareholders. Then, I also examine the more realistic setting 
of imperfect information where shareholders only receive a signal of the manager’s 
actions, and must decide if they believe that a fraud has been committed. In both settings, 
shareholders of a company first have to choose between strong and weak monitoring of 
their manager. If strong monitoring is chosen, the manager is unable to commit fraud as 
he is given no opportunity to do so. If shareholders choose weak monitoring, they can 
later decide to litigate if they observe that fraud occurs (in the perfect information setting) 
or if they have reason to suspect that it has occurred (in the imperfect information 
setting).  
Though fraud itself is unobservable in the real world, we do observe various 
signals of managerial behavior, including the one I focus on here, restatements of the 
firm’s financial statements. A restatement is a noisy signal of fraud, since a restatement 
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could result either from fraud having been committed or from a genuine accounting error. 
Thus, when a shareholder observes a restatement, she has to deduce whether it is 
attributable to a fraud or an error, and accordingly decide whether to sue. In my model, 
the shareholder bases this decision on the type of monitoring in the firm (weak or strong). 
This is because a strongly monitored firm has structures in place that reduce a manager’s 
opportunity to commit fraud. Thus, the probability of a strongly monitored firm 
committing fraud is lower; and the restatement is more likely to come from an accounting 
error than from fraud. However in the case of a weakly monitored firm, few structures 
exist to prevent the manager from committing fraud. Therefore, if such a firm restates its 
financial statements, the probability of fraud is higher and a shareholder is more likely to 
sue. 
This model assumes that the legal system establishes the manager’s guilt or 
innocence beyond all doubt, both under the perfect information and imperfect 
information settings.7 A manager guilty of fraud is punished with a monetary penalty and 
a wrongly accused manager is cleared and released. However the shareholder bears a cost 
of suing a manager suspected of fraud. This cost can be thought of as the money spent on 
procuring lawyers and the time and energy involved in filing a claim; and is incurred 
whether the suit is successful (upon which the shareholder earns damages - a cash award) 
or not. This cost attached to suing prevents frivolous lawsuits, making it more likely that 
only legitimate cases come to trial. The primary prediction from the model is that 
shareholders either choose to have ex ante strong monitoring, or to have weak monitoring 
and resort to ex post litigation. These two mechanisms operate as substitutes. Further, the 
7 However this is not essential for the results of the model to go through. As long as the
payoff to a manager from committing fraud and being sued is lower than the payoff from
not committing fraud, the results will still hold.
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assumption of heterogeneous monitoring costs leads to other interesting predictions about 
whether monitoring or litigation is the optimal choice for a firm based on firm-specific 
characteristics. 
Baseline perfect information model  
 
For simplicity, let us assume that there is only one shareholder who owns all the 
shares of the company and makes all the decisions. In this first simple model I assume 
that there exist two possible levels of monitoring: strong or perfect monitoring (MH) and 
weak or no monitoring (ML).8 The sequence of actions is as follows. The shareholder first 
can select weak monitoring (which does not cost anything) or strong monitoring, which 
comes at a cost c that varies by firm. The shareholder’s choice of strong or weak 
monitoring determines the manager’s opportunity to commit fraudulent action. Selection 
of strong monitoring MH gives the manager no opportunity to commit fraud. (This 
simplistic model assumes perfect monitoring can be ensured by selecting MH). If weak 
monitoring is chosen, the manager has the opportunity to commit fraud, which gives him 
a private benefit of N. ‘F’ and ‘S’ are the decision variables that describe the actions of the 
manager and shareholders, respectively. The variable ‘F’ is assigned a value of ‘1’ if the 
manager commits fraud and ‘0’ otherwise. The shareholder can then decide whether to 
sue or not. The variable S reflects this decision and takes a value of ‘1’ if the shareholder 
sues and ‘0’ otherwise. Filing a lawsuit comes at a cost ‘a’ to the shareholder. These 
litigation expenses are incurred regardless of the outcome of the suit. Finally, if the 
manager is discovered by law to have committed fraud, he pays a penalty ‘p’. 
 
8 More generally, one can think of three levels (perfect, partial and no monitoring) or
even a continuum of monitoring levels. In the continuous setting, different levels of
monitoring give a manager differing opportunities to commit fraud.
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The manager’s payoffs and the shareholder’s payoffs depend on their actions and 
are described in the table below. Payoffs in cells are the manager’s payoff followed by 
the shareholder’s payoff. 
Shareholder’s decision (S=1 indicates a lawsuit) 
Manager’s decision 
(F = 1 indicates  
fraud) 
For any interesting conclusions, it must be assumed that p-a P 0, i.e. the 
shareholder gets a positive benefit by suing if the manager is discovered to have 
committed fraud. (If this is not the case, even having perfect knowledge of fraud will not 
induce the shareholder to sue as litigation is too costly.) The values of all variables 
including p, a and N are known to both parties. In this perfect information model, the 
shareholder can perfectly observe the action the manager has taken, i.e. whether F=0 or 1.  
This model can be solved by backward induction. Consider first the case where 
ML or weak monitoring is chosen.  
i) The shareholder’s decision at t=2, given she has chosen ML earlier is as follows:
Since F is perfectly observable, the shareholder’s decision can be directly conditioned on 
it. The shareholder will sue (S=1) if fraud is observed (F=1) and not otherwise (S=0 
otherwise).  
S =1 S  =0 
F
=1 
N – p, 
-c -N + p –
a
N ,
– c - N
F
=0 
0, 
- c - a
0, 
- c
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If instead the shareholder had chosen MH, the stronger monitoring structure, at 
time 0, then this would have precluded any fraud and thus the shareholder’s choice at t=2 
would always be not to sue (S=0). 
ii) Assuming that N – p R 0 always (the manager is made to return all the money
appropriated and perhaps even pay a penalty9), then the manager’s decision at t=1 is not 
to commit fraud (F=0). This assumption implies that the manager never commits fraud in 
a perfect information world. 
iii) Finally, the shareholder’s decision at t=0 is always to choose the weaker
monitoring structure, ML, because outcomes are observable and litigation can always be 
selected in case fraud is observed to occur. 
This benchmark perfect information model gives us the interesting result 
that in a world where fraud is observable, it is optimal not to impose any ex ante 
monitoring controls. Subsequent legal action conditioned on observing managerial 
misdeeds is the best course of action. If losing lawsuits is costly to managers, fraud is 
never an optimal choice. This benchmark tells us that we see governance and monitoring 
in the world only because shareholders can not completely observe fraud or cannot prove 
it beyond doubt in the courts; i.e. due to imperfect information conditions. 
Imperfect information model  
In a more realistic model, the value of F (the variable representing fraud) is not 
directly observed by the shareholders. Instead, what they observe is a noisy signal of 
9 This is quite consistent with our observations of real-world outcomes of litigation in which the fines often
exceed the actual losses suffered by the shareholder. Another way of looking at this would be that instead
of the manager directly compensating the shareholders for their monetary loss, the payment is made by the
D&O insurer of the company to the shareholders, as is often the case in the real world. However the
manager suffers reputational penalties at least equal to the monetary reimbursement. The effect of this
separation is the same – the shareholder is compensated and the manager pays a penalty.
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fraud, namely whether the firm has restated its financial statements or not. This is 
denoted by the restatement variable r which takes the value 1 or 0 based on F. If F =1, r is 
assumed to take the value of 1 with the probability S and 0 with probability (1- S). If F =0 
then r takes the value 0 with probability S and 1 with probability (1- S). Note that the 
accuracy of the signal (S) can take any value as long as it is informative.10 
Actions of the manager and the shareholder are represented in extensive form in 
Figure 3.1. The final payoffs to manager and shareholder remain the same as before and 
are unaffected by the r variable. The decision boxes connected by a dotted line represent 
an information set. If a shareholder sees that a restatement has occurred (r=1), she cannot 
tell if the manager has committed fraud or not, and hence the shareholder’s decision 
boxes following the two outcomes (F=1 and r=1) and (F=0 and r=1) are connected by a 
dotted line. The same applies to the shareholder’s information set after no restatement has 
been observed.  
As in the perfect information case, the shareholders’ problem at t =2 is analyzed 
first, when ML was chosen at t=0. (In the simple model, if MH was chosen this eliminates 
all opportunities to the manager to commit fraud, and hence S =0 is always the optimal 
choice regardless of r.) I propose that there exist two mixed-strategy equilibria in this 
model which are described below. 
 
Equilibrium 1: Sue if restate =1, mixed strategy if restate=0
10 These conditional probabilities of a restatement do not need to be the same for F=0
and F=1. Without loss of generality, they are both assumed to be equal to in order to
simplify the variable structure.
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Denote the initial (unconditional) probability that a manager commits fraud by T.
Note that this is unconditional and unrelated to the value of r. Consider first the case 
where the shareholder sees that no restatement has occurred (r=0). In this case, suppose 
she chooses to sue (S=1) with a probability of U and not to sue (S=0) with probability (1-
U). The posterior probability in terms of T is Pr (F=1/r=0) = (1 )
2
µ 
µ  µ

+ 
.11 For this to be 
a mixed strategy equilibrium, the following two conditions must hold:   
The shareholder is indifferent between choosing S=1 and S=0, given the mixed 
strategy employed by the manager. This gives us 
T =
(1 ) (1 2 )
a
p a

   
(1.1)  
The manager is indifferent between choosing F=1 and F=0, given the mixed 
strategy employed by the shareholder. This gives us the value of U.
U =
p
 (1.2) 
The shareholder’s utilities from selecting S=1 and S=0 when r=1 are given below.  
If S=1 is chosen, the shareholder’s utility = 
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
(-N+B–a) + (1-
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
)(-a)  
If S=0 is chosen, the shareholder’s utility is zero. Given the value of µ in (1.1), the 
utilities under the two choices can be compared.  
It is optimal to select S=1 when r=1.       (1.3) 
Equilibrium 2: Don’t sue if restate=0, mixed strategy if restate=1 
11 See Appendix A for details of calculations.
35
Once again we consider first the mixed strategy case where the shareholder sees a 
restatement. In this case, suppose she chooses S=1 with a probability of W and S=0 with 
probability (1-W). The unconditional probability that the manager commits fraud is 
denoted by T. We get Pr (F=1/r=1) =   
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
. For this to be a mixed strategy 
equilibrium, we need: 
T = (1 )
(1 2 )
a
a p

 

 +
(2.1)  
W =
p
 (2.2) 
When the value of r=0 is realized, the result is a pure strategy response described 
below. The shareholder’s payoffs are: 
If S=1 is chosen, the shareholder’s utility is 
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
(-N + p – a) + (1-
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
)
.(-a)  
If S=0 is chosen, the shareholder’s utility is zero. Given the value of µ in (2.1), the 
optimal choice on seeing no restatement is not to sue.     (2.3) 
Refinement of equilibria  
In this imperfect information setting, both of the equilibria described above are 
subgame perfect. They can be further refined by evaluating whether they fulfill the 
necessary conditions to be sequential equilibria. Sequential equilibria have to fulfill the 
conditions of sequential rationality as well as consistency. By defining the shareholder’s 
strategy as {S=0} off the equilibrium path, both equilibria described above will fulfill the 
conditions of sequential rationality and consistency and hence both are sequential 
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equilibria. Since payoffs are known to both parties and there are no hidden ‘types’ of 
players, equilibrium dominance cannot be used to eliminate either of them. However we 
can find the Pareto dominant equilibrium by comparing the probability of fraud µ in both 
equilibria from (1.1) and (2.1). Given our assumption that p > a, the instance of fraud is 
always higher in the first mixed strategy equilibrium where the shareholder plays a mixed 
strategy when r = 0. Thus equilibrium (2) Pareto dominates equilibrium (1). In other 
words, both these equilibria are equally likely and reasonable by most measures, but 
equilibrium (2) might be preferred in that it involves lower levels of both fraud and 
lawsuits.  
Comparative statics  
 
Given the expected payoffs of the shareholder as calculated above, we can now 
derive the initial decision of whether to choose high or low monitoring. Since firms are 
heterogeneous in monitoring costs, only shareholders of firms with a low monitoring cost 
ci would choose to pay this upfront and ensure the absence of fraud. Shareholders of 
firms with a prohibitively high ci would choose weak monitoring and sue later depending 
on the value of r they observe. In other words, if ci were smaller than the expected cost of 
suing conditional on the signal r, the firm would choose to monitor rather than possibly 
make an erroneous judgment about the fraud (based on a noisy signal) and suffer a loss of 
litigation expenses.  
 In the empirical study that follows, I first investigate whether firms with 
one or more institutional blockholders and firms with a high proportion of independent 
directors are less likely to face litigation, consistent with the predictions of this model. 
Both institutional blockholders as well as independent directors are considered in the 
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literature to play a monitoring role in the company. I also identify differences in firm 
characteristics that could possibly account for firm-level variation in monitoring costs, 
and hence would determine the firm’s choice between monitoring and litigation.  
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Chapter 4
Ex Ante Monitoring or Ex Post Litigation? Empirical Tests
Data description 
The initial sample in this study consists of all the firms in the Compustat database 
over the 1997 to 2001 period. This sample is then further reduced to firms for which I 
could find board, analyst and compensation information as described below. Of this set of 
firms, I identify the firms that have experienced restatements and SCA suit firms from 
two separate lists.  
The data on securities class action suits is from the Stanford Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse and consists of all securities class action suits from 1996 to 2002, 
numbering about 1180 observations. The sample includes only securities class action 
observations that took place after the securities law reform (PSLRA12) in 1995 and before 
the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This restriction is in order to 
exclude any impact of regulatory and legal changes and to minimize structural breaks in 
the data.
12 The Public Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA 1995) was designed to
discourage frivolous securities litigation. Among other measures, it transfers the
defendant’s legal fees to the plaintiff for claims lacking substantial legal and factual
support and imposes limits on attorneys’ fees.
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The data on earnings restatements is primarily from the General Accounting 
Office database of restatements and consists of 963 firm-years (951 unique firms) that 
announced earnings restatements in the period from 1997 to mid-2002. According to the 
GAO report, the data “excludes routine restatements and those resulting from changes in 
accounting policies. It focuses only on restatements that indicate accounting 
irregularities, including so-called aggressive accounting practices, intentional and 
unintentional misuse of facts applied to financial statements, oversight or 
misinterpretation of accounting rules, and fraud.”  
On merging the restating and suit firms with the data available on Compustat and 
Execucomp, there remain 775 restating firms and 485 SCA suit firms in the sample. For 
test purposes, the characteristics of these firms are compared to those of the remaining 
firms in the database during the period 1997-2001.  
 The other variables used in this study are related to compensation, 
institutional ownership and board characteristics. The CEO compensation variables 
including proportion of shares held by management (Shrownpc), total current 
compensation including options (TDC1) and the Black-Scholes value of option grants 
(BS_Valu) are obtained from the Execucomp database. Institutional investors’ holdings 
are obtained from 13f filings through the Thomson Financial database. For a smaller 
subset of the firms in this sample, the number of total and inside directors is available 
from the Compact Disclosure database.   
The data are matched up as follows. Each restatement is matched with a lawsuit, 
if any, in the subsequent year. The use of only one year for matching is due to the federal 
limitations for class actions to be filed. The rule states that action must be brought within 
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one year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation (or within one year after 
they could reasonably have been ascertained). Given these rules, any subsequent or future 
restatement may not be closely related to the subject matter of the lawsuit. In order to 
compare corporate governance characteristics across restatement firms with and without 
securities class action suits in year t+1 (controlling for a restatement in year t), I examine 
compensation, board and monitoring data for the year prior to the year of restatement, or 
two years prior to the class action suit (year t-1 in this example). This is in line with my 
claim that governance and monitoring should be ex ante deterrents to earnings 
manipulation, and substitutes to the ex post measure of securities litigation. Using board 
composition and other variables in the year of the restatement can be flawed as the 
discovery of the earnings manipulation and subsequent restatement itself may cause 
substantial changes in board composition, executive compensation and other measures. 
At the same time, data from further back in the firm’s history may have little or no impact 
on an event happening years later.13 
Empirical tests 
Each observation in the dataset is a combination firm-year, some of which have 
restatements announced, some of which have lawsuits announced, and many of which 
have neither restatements nor lawsuits. Of the 10,922 firm-years in this panel with 
Compustat asset data available, 771 (7%) have restatements and 485 (4%) have lawsuits. 
Thus, while restatements and lawsuits are not common, they are frequent enough to be a 
focus of study. Further, the restatements and lawsuits are not clustered in any one year, 
13 For instance, Strahan(1998) looks at measures of agency problems in firms in the year
1990 and then looks up to 8 years in the future for indications of shareholder-manager
conflict in the form of lawsuits.
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but are spread across the sample period. Figure 4.1 depicts the number of securities class 
action lawsuits by year. All data on securities class action lawsuits as well as settlements 
for this and subsequent tables are obtained from the Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse, jointly maintained by Cornerstone Research. From the graph, there is a 
sharp peak in the number of lawsuits in the year 2001, due to a sharp increase in IPO-
based litigation in that year. In order to avoid having results that are solely driven by this 
spike in lawsuits in 2001, I remove IPO-based lawsuits as far as possible from the sample 
before performing the tests described in this section.  
The firms experiencing lawsuits in this study come from a variety of industries. 
However, and as might be expected, some industries are more prone to securities class 
action litigation. Table 4.1 examines this effect by listing the top ten industries which 
have experienced the maximum number of class action lawsuits in this sample period. It 
appears that high growth industries such as pharmaceuticals and technology are more 
prone to lawsuits. Securities class action lawsuits can differ in their exact allegation even 
though their overriding theme is very similar. Most lawsuits are triggered by improper 
disclosure by management leading to losses for shareholders. More details about the 
specific allegations in lawsuits are tabulated in Table 4.2, which lists the top ten most 
common allegations in lawsuits. From this table, it is clear that most lawsuits allege either 
errors of commission or omission with respect to disclosure by management: lawsuits 
might be triggered either by disclosing false information or by a failure to disclose 
relevant information, thereby resulting in losses to shareholders. 
It is interesting to note that a very large proportion of these lawsuits never go to 
trial. They are instead settled out of court. Table 4.3 lists the ten largest settlements of 
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securities class action lawsuits in the sample period. The information is current as of 
February 13, 2006 and lists the largest settlements falling in the post-reform act period 
from 1996 to 2005. Though these high-profile cases are not the norm, these settlements 
represent a substantial portion of the company’s total value, indicating that this is a very 
significant economic event in these companies’ lives.  
The fundamental research question I ask in this chapter is whether the existence 
of monitoring mechanisms such as blockholder monitoring or outside director monitoring 
is negatively related to the probability of being sued. As a first step towards answering 
that question, I present simple statistics regarding the correlation coefficient between 
lawsuits and some important variables in Table 4.4. Panel A lists correlation coefficients 
and P-Values of the correlation between litigation and different monitoring variables. 
Different measures of blockholder monitoring are considered, from a dummy variable to 
simply indicate the existence of a blockholder, to the number of block holders and the 
proportion of shares held by them. The total holdings by institutions and the number of 
institutional block holders are also considered. The director monitoring variables include 
the total number of directors, the number of independent directors and a dummy variable 
indicating whether the CEO is on the board of the company. The correlation coefficients 
indicate that all these different measures of monitoring are significantly negatively 
related to the subsequent occurrence of a lawsuit, thus providing a basis for further tests. 
The correlations in Panel A indicate that the incidence of securities lawsuits is negatively 
correlated with the existence of institutional blockholders in the firm. This result supports 
the hypothesis that securities litigation is a substitute for monitoring by blockholders of 
the firm. The negative relationship between the number of independent directors and 
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lawsuits also suggests that litigation is a substitute for monitoring by an independent 
board.  
Panel B reports the correlations between firm characteristics and the occurrence 
of securities litigation. The CEO compensation variables are positively related to 
subsequent litigation. This supports the hypothesis that firms which pay their managers 
highly may lack sufficient internal controls and accountability and thus need lawsuits for 
ex post action. The correlations in Panel B also support the theory that complex firms 
(measured by Intangible Assets or Stock volatility respectively) are more likely to rely on 
litigation than on monitoring as a way to keep managers in check. The regression 
includes the natural log of market capitalization as a control for size, which is positively 
related to the likelihood of litigation. Dividend yield is expected to be negatively 
correlated with lawsuits in accordance with the model, as managers of dividend paying 
firms are not considered to be entrenched, and internal monitoring may be a cheaper 
option for such firms. However this hypothesis is not supported by the correlation 
coefficient between dividend yield and litigation which is statistically insignificant. Also, 
the proportion of shares held by the CEO and the proportion of total CEO pay to sales 
are not significantly correlated with the risk of litigation. This does not lend support to 
the theory that high CEO ownership works to align incentives and reduces the risk of 
shareholder litigation. 
Any multivariate examination of the determinants of securities lawsuits must 
include a control for the occurrence of a financial restatement. Prior research (for 
example, Wu (2002), Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) among many others) has 
documented significant negative market reactions to restatement announcements. In order 
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to confirm that the restatements included in this sample are largely material restatements 
and have received negative responses from the market, I calculate cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) for the restating firms on the restatement announcement date. On average, 
restating firms experience a -6.5% buy and hold returns on the date of the restatement 
announcement and a -9.9% buy and hold return on the day following the announcement. 
CAR results are negative both in the days prior to and immediately after the 
announcement and all these results are significant at a high 0.1% level.   
Table 4.5 identifies the characteristics of restating firms by reporting results from 
a logistic regression with the occurrence of a restatement as a binary dependent variable 
(taking the values 1 and 0) and firm characteristics as the independent variables. The 
regression includes controls for size and dummy variables representing sample years, as 
some years tend to have significantly more restatements. Although total compensation is 
not significantly different for restating firms as compared to other firms, incentive-based 
pay (computed here as the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of option grants to total 
compensation), both for the CEO and for the top 5 executives, is higher for the restating 
firms. This result is consistent with the findings of Beneish (1999), Kedia (2003) and 
Denis, Hanouna and Sarin (2005) who argue that stock options generate incentives to 
manipulate earnings. I do not find evidence of a significant linear relationship between 
board size (including log of board size), or the proportion of independent directors on the 
board, and the occurrence of a restatement.  Other variables such as the size and 
independence of the board of directors and dividend yield are not significantly related to 
the probability of a restatement. 
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To continue to test whether lawsuits are an ex post substitute to effective ex ante 
monitoring, in this section I describe the results of further univariate testing. Wilcoxon 
mean-difference tests were performed that examine differences in average firm 
characteristics between firms with and without lawsuits.14 Table 4.6 reports the results of 
these tests. A higher level of monitoring in firms that do not have lawsuits would support 
my hypothesis that lawsuits come into force in companies which have weak monitoring. 
Panel A provides tests of the substitutability of lawsuits and monitoring by listing the 
mean value of blockholder and director variables for firms in my sample which have and 
have not been sued. Column 1 contains the averages for firms that do not experience a 
lawsuit in the sample period. Column 2 consists of average values for firms that have 
experienced a lawsuit in the sample period. Firm-years in column 2 have a lower average 
incidence of monitoring by many measures, lending support to the hypothesis that 
litigation and blockholder monitoring are substitutes. These lawsuit firms have fewer 
analysts following them, fewer independent directors on their boards and a smaller 
proportion of their shares held by institutional blockholders. The last column gives the P-
Value of the Wilcoxon test statistic, which is significant for most of these differences. 
Panel B of Table 4.6 compares mean values of firm characteristics between the same two 
sets of firms: firms which have not experienced lawsuits in this sample, and firms which 
have. Values of compensation variables are invariably higher in Column 2 compared to 
Column 1, supporting the hypothesis that firms with well-paid managers tend to choose 
litigation, possibly because it is harder for blockholders to monitor entrenched managers. 
Dividend yield is lower for lawsuit firms, again consistent with the hypothesis that 
 
14 The Wilcoxon Z statistic is the normal approximation of the Wilcoxon Statistic and includes a
continuity correction. Results without the normal approximation are identical.
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managers of dividend-paying firms are easier to monitor internally. The lawsuit firms 
tend to be larger firms with predictably low return on assets in the year prior to the 
lawsuit. Finally, complexity of a firm’s operations (proxied by the variables PPE or 
tangible assets and Black-Scholes volatility of the stock) appears to be positively related 
to the likelihood of a lawsuit, consistent with the prediction that complex firms are harder 
to monitor internally. However the standard deviation of analyst forecasts is lower for 
lawsuit firms as well, making lawsuits the preferred means of retaliation by shareholders 
when companies miss consensus forecasts, perhaps due to manipulation or malfeasance. 
A further set of tests examine whether lawsuits and monitoring are substitutes, 
and if so, what factors determine the choice between them. Tables 4.7 reports the results 
of tests for a substitution effect between lawsuits and monitoring. A multivariate logit 
regression is used in which the dependent variable Suit is a binary-valued indicator that 
takes a value of 1 or 0. The regressions also control for the occurrence of a restatement 
and the results show that this factor is indeed an important determinant of the occurrence 
of subsequent lawsuits, as its coefficient is positive and significantly different from zero. 
The results also show that the existence of a blockholder is significantly negatively 
related to the occurrence of a suit. The number of independent directors on the board also 
appears to be significantly negatively related to the occurrence of a lawsuit. These results 
suggest that securities class action lawsuits are a substitute to monitoring by blockholders 
and independent directors. Lawsuits come into force as a disciplining mechanism in firms 
that do not have strong institutional blockholders who might be expected to monitor 
managers. Alternative specifications of the dependent variable for this test give very 
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similar results.15 Finally, I test to see if the number of analysts that follow the activities of 
the company is seen as a form of monitoring and is negatively related to a subsequent 
lawsuit. However I do not find any evidence to support this claim. The regression results 
include year and industry dummy variables to control for these fixed effects. I also adjust 
the standard errors for clustering of variables due to multiple observations of the same 
firm through different years. The control variables include size and profitability 
measures. 
The variables used in the logit regression analysis, like variables used in similar 
studies, are subject to endogeneity concerns. In a regression of litigation on blockholding 
measures, the error term may be positively correlated with the blockholding measure 
leading to biased estimates of OLS coefficients. Results of a Hausman test comparing 
OLS and Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates of this regression in Table 4.8 
confirm that this is a valid concern. The Hausman test statistics indicate that 2SLS gives 
superior estimates of regression coefficients compared to OLS, both for the relationship 
between blockholder existence and litigation, and institutional holdings and litigation. To 
address this concern, I repeat the test conducted in Table 4.7 but using 2SLS procedures 
instead of logistic regression. I use an indicator variable that assumes a value of 1 if the 
company is a member of the S&P 500 index. This variable is used to instrument for 
monitoring by blockholders or institutional blockholders. An S&P 500 indicator is a good 
instrument for institutional holdings as institutions show a strong preference for S&P 
index stocks. Results of the first stage regression of institutional holdings on this S&P 
15 An alternative specification is to specify a multinomial choice regression by coding
observations with lawsuits as ‘1’, observations with an institutional blockholder as ‘3’
and observations with both a lawsuit and an institutional blockholder as a ‘2’. Results
remain unchanged.
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membership variable are presented in Panel A of Table 4.9. The instrument is closely 
correlated with the existence of a blockholder, a high number of blockholders and a high 
proportion of institutional holdings. In the second stage, results of which are presented in 
Panel B, the occurrence of a lawsuit is regressed on this instrument and other controls. 
The significant negative coefficients -.1511 and -.0239 confirm the previous finding that 
litigation and institutional shareholdings are negatively related. Results from the 2SLS 
analysis confirm the findings from the logistic regressions, both in general and regarding 
the negative relationship between litigation and blockholder or institutional monitoring.  
One of the predictions of the model concerns the probability of a lawsuit 
following a restatement. According to the model, a shareholder views a restatement very 
differently depending on whether it comes from a strongly or weakly monitored firm. A 
restatement from a strongly governed firm is attributed to error whereas a restatement 
from a weakly governed firm is more likely to be followed by a lawsuit. To test this 
prediction, I calculate the marginal effects of a restatement on the probability of a 
lawsuit. Table 4.10 reports the marginal effects of a restatement on the probability of a 
lawsuit, for firms with and without an institutional blockholder. This table provides a 
further test of the predictions of the theoretical model. Indeed, on average the incremental 
probability of facing a lawsuit when a firm restates its financial statements is lower for 
firms with at least one institutional blockholder (0.08) than for firms without institutional 
block holders (0.14). Similarly, the sample is also divided into firms that have an above-
average proportion of institutional shareholders and those that have a below-average 
proportion of institutional shareholders. The proportion of institutional shareholders is 
calculated by dividing total shares owned by institutions by the total shares outstanding. 
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Once again, a restatement by a firm with higher than average proportion of institutional 
monitors appears to be viewed benignly (is less likely to be followed by a lawsuit) as 
compared to a restatement by a firm with less institutional shareholdings.  
The results in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 provide a strong test of the primary predictions 
of the model developed in Section II. From Table 4.9, firms with institutional 
blockholders, or a higher proportion of shares held by institutions, are less likely to be 
sued. From Table 4.10, a restatement coming from a weakly monitored firm is more 
likely to be followed by a lawsuit than a restatement from a strongly monitored firm. 
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Additional evidence 
 
In this section I report the results of robustness checks to test whether my 
hypothesis regarding the substitutability of monitoring and litigation is supported by any 
further evidence.  
Do institutions monitor or vote with their feet? Institutional holdings 
pre and post lawsuits 
The empirical literature examining the role of institutional investors has proposed 
two possible actions that institutions can take when they disapprove of the actions of the 
management of a company. The ‘voting with their feet’ hypothesis claims that 
institutions exit the stocks of companies whose practices they disapprove of. The 
monitoring hypothesis, in contrast, argues that institutions keep their shareholdings and 
try to improve the companies from within through activism. This prompts the question of 
whether institutions anticipate lawsuits (or the manipulation or fraud that was their cause) 
and sell their holdings in a stock, or if they stay and monitor to try and improve 
performance of the company.  
In order to examine this, I run an event-time regression with the proportion of 
shares in a firm held by institutions as the dependent variable. This regression includes 
only firms which that experienced securities class action lawsuits, and its results are in 
Table 4.11. In this regression, I use dummy variables for event years where year 0 is 
defined as the fiscal year when the lawsuit was filed, year 1 as the fiscal year after the 
lawsuit, and so on. The regression coefficients on these year dummies provide 
information about whether institutions own more of the stock in these years or less. I also 
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control for calendar year effects using year dummies as some years have more lawsuits 
than others. Other controls include Fama-French industry dummies, and other factors that 
have been found to influence institutions’ decision to buy a stock, including Book to 
Market, Size, profitability, leverage, previous year stock returns, and past share turnover 
(a proxy for liquidity). I used lagged share turnover two years prior to the year in 
question, so as to remove the effects of any immediate illiquidity caused by the lawsuit 
announcement.  
I find that, after controlling for the common determinants of institutional 
shareholder buying behavior, institutions do tend to move out of a stock that is about to 
face litigation. The coefficients for year 0 and year -1 are significant and negative, 
indicating that institutions sell the stock in the year of the litigation announcement and in 
the previous year. However in subsequent years, there is no strong evidence of selling, 
indicating that institutions may try to stay and improve internal controls of firms.  
Have lawsuits decreased after Sarbanes-Oxley? 
If strong governance or monitoring is in fact a substitute to ex post litigation, then 
an external shock to governance requirements that led to improved governance should 
also lead to a lower level of litigation. The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
was just such an external shock, imposing stringent governance and disclosure 
requirements on all public firms. It is a natural question, then, whether there has been a 
substantial reduction in securities class action lawsuits since Sarbanes-Oxley was 
instituted.  
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Securities class actions as a whole, however, increased since Sarbanes-Oxley due 
to a variety of reasons. Independent regulatory changes prompted a big jump in IPO-
related litigation in 2001 which has continued into the next few years. A large proportion 
of the litigation has also targeted private firms that were not affected under Sarbanes-
Oxley. In order to identify and isolate the Sarbanes-Oxley effect, I use Stanford 
Clearinghouse data on allegations and company characteristics, and consider only public 
firms in this part of the study. Figure 4.2 shows the number of lawsuits against public 
firms in the years prior and subsequent to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The fitted polynomial 
line shows a drop in the number of lawsuits against public firms after 2002. I also test this 
more rigorously by controlling for the common determinants of lawsuits, and testing for a 
structural change in the number of lawsuits in 2002 using a Chow test. Results of this test 
are given just below the figure and show that a significant change occurred at around the 
time that Sarbanes-Oxley came into effect, and that the number of lawsuits has 
significantly dropped. This additional evidence supports the conclusions described in the 
previous section.  
Monitoring and fraud 
The third robustness check involves examining the relationship between 
monitoring and fraud. If monitoring by institutions and boards is a substitute for 
litigation, then it must have an effect on the likelihood of fraud in a company. If evidence 
exists to show that monitoring by institutions reduces the likelihood of fraud, and 
litigation is an after the fact attempt to compensate shareholders for their losses due to 
managerial fraud, then it is easy to see that monitoring and litigation are substitutes. 
Monitoring then would prevent fraud, whereas litigation is a response to fraud.  
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I examine this proposition by looking at a sample of 70 firms that have been a 
target of the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Actions, or AAERs. These 
firms are matched with a control sample of 70 other firms which have not experienced 
either AAERs or lawsuits, and which are in the same 4-digit SIC industry code as the 
sample firms. The control firms are selected so that they are closest to the sample firms in 
size and profitability, among the firms in the same industry. Using this matched sample 
of firms, I run a conditional logit regression in which ‘SEC fraud’ is the dependent 
variable. Results of this regression are in Table 4.12. This is regressed on size, 
profitability, leverage, and the proportion of accruals that are discretionary (an indication 
of earnings manipulation), and the monitoring variables. I test whether monitoring by 
institutions, analysts or by independent boards prevent fraud. However, I do not find 
strong evidence of any of these variables predicting the occurrence of fraud. Part of the 
reason for this result may be the very small sample size, and hence the results on this 
front are inconclusive. 
Taken as a whole, these tests provide convincing evidence that monitoring by 
institutional investors, analysts, and independent boards is a substitute to litigation. In the 
next section I analyze corporate disclosure, one of the mechanisms by which good 
monitoring may mitigate the agency problem and reduce the incidence of fraud and 
litigation.  
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Chapter 5: The Quality of Disclosure in Annual Reports and the Risk
of Litigation
In this section I develop a measure to analyze the quality of disclosure in annual 
reports through content analysis of the words used in the document. Poor disclosure by 
this measure is then tested for its ability to predict litigation by shareholders. I also 
compare this measure with existing measures of poor disclosure described in the 
literature.  
Inadequate or misleading disclosure is one of the most common allegations in 
securities class action lawsuits.16 This allegation of poor disclosure is frequently coupled 
with other allegations such as misusing information through insider trading and is a major 
driver of securities lawsuits. Though this relationship between poor disclosure and 
litigation is well known to securities law practitioners, no attempt has been made to study 
or quantify it. An analysis of the types of disclosure associated with litigation would be 
helpful in setting standards for the information flow between managers and the 
shareholders they represent. Moreover such a measure of disclosure quality would also be 
useful in a general sense. The aim of good disclosure is to convey sufficient and timely 
information to shareholders, and securities litigation is most frequently a stated response 
to poor disclosure. Hence any measure of disclosure that can predict litigation is also a 
good general indicator of poor disclosure.  
The language used in managerial communications to shareholders can be an 
important signal of managements’ vision and outlook towards the future of the company, 
 
16 See Table 4.2 for the most common allegations in securities class action lawsuits. The
top three allegations concern poor disclosure. Data is from the Stanford Class Action
Clearinghouse database.
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as well as their perspective on past events and current profitability. The psychology 
literature has developed methods to analyze words used in both speech and writing, 
through content analysis packages and techniques. These packages use built-in 
dictionaries to categorize words according to various measures such as ‘tone’ or
‘optimism’. A document analyzed in this manner is given scores along different 
dimensions and an analysis of these scores can provide information about the document 
along various dimensions such as positive or negative tone, vague or factual words, and 
the proportion of numerical information and forward-looking information. In my study I 
use two specific content analysis software programs which are described below.  
Content Analysis Software Programs  
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) is a text analysis software program 
designed by James W. Pennebaker, Roger J. Booth, and Martha E. Francis. LIWC 
analyzes text along different dimensions including the rate at which the authors of the 
document use positive or negative emotion words, self-references, big words, unique or 
repetitive words, strong and weak words, predictive and vague words, future and past-
related words, and overstatement and understatement. LIWC contains over 70 built-in 
categories and allows words to be present in more than one category. Unlike some text 
and content analysis software, LIWC operates simply by counting the number of words in 
the document under each category. This methodology, while straightforward, also has 
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certain limitations. For example, the software is unable to distinguish between different 
meanings of a word, and cannot modify its results based on usage in a sentence.  
LIWC has been used in a number of studies: to differentiate between lying and 
telling the truth, analyze dominance in a conversation, and even predict consumer buying 
patterns. However to my knowledge this is the first study to use LIWC to analyze 
company documents, specifically SEC filings.  
General Inquirer 
The General Inquirer (GI) is a text analysis program developed by Philip Stone at 
Harvard and made available for academic research purposes. It specializes in analyzing 
large quantities of text and outputs a matrix of "tag counts" for each of 180 categories, 
with separate rows of counts for each file processed.  
A distinguishing feature of General Inquirer is its disambiguation routine. The 
software specializes in differentiating between alternate meanings of homonyms 
according to the context. For example, it distinguishes between "race" as a contest, "race" 
as moving rapidly, "race" as a group of people of common descent, and "race" in the 
idiom "rat race".  
The General Inquirer also cautiously removes common regular suffixes so that 
one entry in a category can match several inflected word forms. A category entry can be 
an inflected word (for example, "swimming"), a root word ("swim" would match 
"swimming", if "swimming" is not a separate entry) or a word sense (for example, 
"swim#1") identified by the disambiguation routines of an inflected or root word form. 
Even though these disambiguation routines often require the Inquirer to make several 
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passes through a sentence, the Inquirer is designed to process large amounts of text in a 
reasonable amount of time.  
Though the General Inquirer has been extensively used in the psychology and 
political science literatures, it is only recently beginning to be used for finance research. 
Tetlock (2005) used this content analysis technique to analyze news articles in the Wall 
Street Journal and their relationship to stock price and volume. The results of the study 
were that high media pessimism predicts downward pressure on market prices followed 
by a reversion to fundamentals, and unusually high or low pessimism predicts high 
market trading volume.  
Data Description  
The data used from this study consists of over 70,000 electronic 10-K filings of 
companies downloaded from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) EDGAR 
database. All publicly held companies are required to file annual financial reports or 10-
Ks with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The complete annual report, in 
contrast, is sent to shareholders and typically contains the same information, presented in 
a better and more readable format, aimed at communicating information to the company. 
Since the basic contents of the 10-K and the annual reports are the same or have few 
differences, and since 10-Ks are easily downloadable and available on the SEC’s website, 
that is the document selected for the purposes of this study. 
The dates of these 10-K documents range from 1993, when EDGAR’s online 
submission process became widely available, to 2005. 10-Ks of all companies that have 
ever filed electronically with the SEC are collected and used in the analysis. The dataset 
is free of survivorship bias because it includes all filings made by companies that existed 
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in any year of the sample. This means that even filings of firms that subsequently 
dropped out of the sample are present in the years that these firms existed and filed 
reports. Information such as filing date, filing type and CIK number (the identifying 
number given by the SEC to its filers) were extracted from the filing and filing headers. 
Separately, I extracted companies’ fiscal year start and end dates from Compustat and 
matched this information with the filings in order to identify the appropriate fiscal year 
that each filing pertains to.  
These 10-K filings were subsequently run through the text analysis programs 
described in the previous section; LIWC and GI. Both programs output the total 
wordcount of the document, the number of words per sentence, absolute wordcounts in 
each of the word categories, and category wordcounts scaled by the total words in the 
document. This dataset was then supplemented using profitability measures, leverage and 
other accounting information from the Compustat database and fiscal-year returns from 
Compustat PDE (Prices, Dividends and Earnings). Further, analyst forecasts and forecast 
error for each firm were added from the I/B/E/S database.  
In order to predict lawsuits using content analysis measures of annual report 
disclosure, I combine this dataset with lawsuit, governance, institutional shareholding and 
blockholding data. The securities class action data is obtained from Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse-Cornerstone Research database for the period 1996-2002 
maintained jointly by Stanford Law School and Cornerstone Research.  I obtain board 
and inside director information from IRRC and institutional blockholder information 
from Thomson Financial’s 13f filings. In addition, I use the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
G-Index or Governance Index which is an index of the number of antitakeover provisions 
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in the company’s charter. I also use the Entrenchment Index or E-Index defined by 
Bebchuk et al. (2004), which comprises a subset of antitakeover provisions from the 
Governance Index.  
Though the annual report or 10-K document is only one of the means by which 
managers communicate with shareholders, it is generally accepted as the most important. 
For example, Botosan (1997) states “Although the annual report is only one means of 
corporate reporting, it should serve as a good proxy for the level of voluntary disclosure 
provided by a firm across all disclosure avenues. This is because annual report disclosure 
levels are positively correlated with the amount of disclosure provided via other media 
(Lang and Lundholm (1993)). The annual report is the focus of my disclosure index 
because the annual report is generally considered to be one of the most important sources 
of corporate information.” As another example, Knutson (1992) states “At the top of 
every analyst’s list (of financial reports used by analysts) is the annual report to 
shareholders. It is the major reporting document and every other financial report is in 
some respect subsidiary or supplementary to it.” 
Empirical Tests 
Using content analysis categories to predict lawsuits 
In this section I describe the empirical analysis that uses the quality of disclosure 
to predict securities class action litigation. Word categories from the content analysis 
packages GI and LIWC described in the previous section are used to develop measures of 
the quality of disclosure. Appendix B contains a basic description of the selected word 
categories along with some of their constituent words. The correlation coefficients among 
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the LIWC word categories are described in Table 5.1 and correlation coefficients among 
GI word categories are described in Table 5.2. In the first section of the analysis, I 
analyze whether firms experiencing lawsuits have fundamentally different disclosure 
patterns along word category dimensions. In order to do this, I examine average values of 
the proportion of words in different word categories, across two subsamples: a set of 
firms that have experienced lawsuits and firms that have not. Word categories that are 
relevant to business context were selected from the multitude of categories. Table 5.3 
lists the results of this analysis. Panel A lists the differences in LIWC word categories 
and Panel B lists differences in GI word categories between the two subsamples. The last 
column in both panels contains the P-Value of the Wilcoxon statistic which tests whether 
the average values of word categories are significantly different between the two 
subsamples. These univariate results (from Panel A) indicate that 10-K reports filed by 
lawsuit firms (averaged over all the years in the sample, and not just the year in which 
they experienced a lawsuit) are on average longer documents, containing fewer numbers, 
more tentative words and less information about the past and present. Also from Panel B, 
we can see that lawsuit firms use fewer weak words (possibly indicating a tendency to 
make extremely confident claims that may not be borne out), and a tendency towards 
overstatement. 
Results from a multivariate analysis of the word categories closely related to the 
likelihood of a lawsuit are consistent with the univariate results discussed above. I use the 
word categories from LIWC and GI, from an analysis of the annual report prior to the 
litigation year, to predict the likelihood of litigation controlling for some of the common 
determinants of lawsuits and for firm-specific accounting and stock returns variables. 
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Results of these logistic regressions are in Table 5.5. The dependent variable in these 
regressions is ‘Suit’, an indicator variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if a securities class 
action lawsuit has occurred in that particular year. The independent variables are content 
analysis word categories from LIWC and GI which are used to predict the occurrence of 
a lawsuit. The data is a panel data set of firm-years, and the standard errors of the 
regression coefficients have been adjusted to account for the repeated observations of the 
same firm that occur in the sample. All LIWC and GI wordcounts are scaled by the total 
document length, and in the case of GI wordcounts, by the document length of GI-
recognizable words. It is also important to note that all the content analysis has been 
carried out on the 10-K report in the year preceding the litigation, if any. Since the data 
includes both the date of submission of the annual report to the SEC, and the date of the 
lawsuit (and the class period), the observations are carefully matched. Hence the content 
analysis may provide a leading indicator of the type of behavior that may have led to the 
lawsuit, if not a direct cause of the lawsuit. The table also lists parameter estimates and P-
values of each estimate. Also listed are the marginal effects of a slight increase in the 
independent variable on the probability that a lawsuit will occur (the dependent variable). 
Each regression specification has controls for years and industries (using Fama-French 
industry definitions) in the sample, in order to remove any industry or time-specific 
effects. In addition, the regressions also include controls for size (the log of market value 
of the shares of the company) and profitability (current, lagged and future return on 
earnings of the company) which are often highly correlated with lawsuits. In addition to 
these controls, I also control for whether a restatement has occurred in the year prior to 
the lawsuit. This is necessary because lawsuits are often triggered by restatements of 
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earnings, in conjunction with poor disclosure. Finally, I also control for stock returns in 
the fiscal year prior to the lawsuit as share price drops are frequently triggers of litigation. 
The table lists marginal effects of a slight change in the regressor on the increase in 
probability of a lawsuit. In addition to the word categories, I also control for various 
governance and monitoring variables which are significantly negatively related to the 
occurrence of a lawsuit as discussed in the previous section.  
I use various word categories from LIWC in order to predict a lawsuit. The total 
number of words used in the 10-K document (LIWC_WC) stands out as a strong predictor 
of lawsuits, since it is positively and significantly related to the likelihood of a 
subsequent lawsuit. Also, documents which contain substantial proportions of negative 
emotional words are more likely to be followed by litigation. The results using LIWC 
categories also indicate that companies whose documents which contain more numerical 
information are less likely to be sued. I also test whether the proportion of words 
referring to past, present and future events in a company are related to the likelihood of a 
lawsuit. Though the results relating to present and future words are inconclusive, the 
proportion of words in the document related to the past is significantly negatively related 
to the likelihood of a lawsuit. The results with numerical information as well as words 
related to the past indicate that more quantitative information, including information 
about past events in a company, is a hallmark of good disclosure, or disclosure that does 
not drive shareholders to litigation. In the next regression, I use GI word categories 
including the document length, positive and negative words, strong and weak words, and 
overstatement and understatement words. Again, the document length is a significant 
predictor of litigation risk. The results using the ‘negative words’ category also 
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corroborate the earlier results with the LIWC ‘negative emotional words’ category. Firms 
whose documents have a higher proportion of negative words are more likely to be sued 
in the following year. Documents with more ‘weak’ words are less likely to trigger 
litigation, whereas documents with ‘strong’ words are more likely do so. This could be 
because companies which make strong claims for the future are unable to follow through 
and may be susceptible to litigation. On the other hand, companies which make moderate 
or weak claims are less likely to face the consequences of not meeting predicted targets. 
Finally, I do not find significant results for predicting litigation risk using the 
‘overstatement’ and ‘understatement’ word categories.  
The coefficients on the control variables are consistent with their predicted 
effects. An accounting restatement in the previous year leads to an increased likelihood of 
a lawsuit, as does poor profitability in the prior year, measured by return on equity. Also 
predictably, poor stock returns in the previous year is positively associated with the 
likelihood of a lawsuit. At the same time, monitoring by blockholders and board 
members is not significantly negatively related to the probability of a lawsuit, after 
controlling for the effect of disclosure in annual reports. This could indicate that 
monitoring by block holders and independent directors prevents lawsuits by improving 
the quality of disclosure in annual reports.  
The last regression uses all word categories from GI and LIWC, using only a 
single control for the total document length. Most of the results from the separate 
regressions are valid in the combined regression as well. Total document length and the 
proportion of numbers in the document are still extremely significant variables in the 
regression. The use of more negative words leads to a higher likelihood of lawsuits, even 
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controlling for the use of other types of words. Further, the use of weak words leads to a 
lower likelihood of lawsuits and the use of strong words is associated with a higher 
likelihood of a lawsuit.  
Unconditional logit regressions on panel data with dummy variables to control for 
fixed effects may be prone to estimation problems in small samples with a large number 
of regressors. Though the sample used in this study is very large, I perform a robustness 
check using the conditional logit regression method proposed by Chamberlain (1980). 
Results of this conditional logit regression are reported in Table 5.6 and are largely 
consistent with the results of the unconditional logit discussed above. 10-K documents 
filed by lawsuit firms are generally longer and have less numerical information compared 
to documents filed by non-lawsuit firms. These documents also provide less information 
about past and future events in the company. One may generalize and say that these 
documents, though longer, are less informative compared to documents filed by non-
lawsuit firms. I define a more rigorous measure of informativeness and describe the 
procedure of calculating it below.  
Using principal components analysis to predict litigation 
In this section I describe the empirical tests in which I use Principal Component 
Analysis of the word categories to predict litigation. Principal component analysis (PCA) 
is a mathematical procedure that transforms a number of possibly correlated variables 
into a (smaller) number of uncorrelated variables called principal components. The first 
principal component accounts for as much of the variability in the data as possible, and 
each succeeding component accounts for as much of the remaining variability as 
possible.  
65
There are three advantages of using Principal Components based on word 
categories instead of using the individual word categories themselves. First, principal 
components analysis reduces the dimensionality of the dataset. Since the two content 
analysis software programs together account for more than 250 word categories, the use 
of Principal Component Analysis reduces these to a more usable number of dimensions 
that can be used as regressors to predict litigation.  Second, the use of Principal 
Components comprising all or a large number of the word categories eliminates the use 
of subjectivity in selecting relevant word categories out of the large numbers of 
categories available in both software programs. Third, this procedure enables the 
discovery of more meaningful underlying variables: in this case, a variable capturing the 
quality of disclosure. Principal Components Analysis is also more suited for the purposes 
of this study than other commonly used techniques such as principal factor analysis.17 
Mathematically, principal components are determined by solving for the 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a square symmetric matrix with sums of squares and 
cross products. The eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue has the same 
direction as the first principal component. The eigenvector associated with the second 
largest eigenvalue determines the direction of the second principal component. The sum 
of the eigenvalues equals the trace of the square matrix and the maximum number of 
eigenvectors equals the number of rows (or columns) of this matrix.  
 
17 Where the purpose of principal component analysis is to derive a small number of linear combinations
(principal components) of a set of variables that retain as much of the information in the original variables
as possible, the purpose of common factor analysis is to explain the correlations or covariances among a set
of variables in terms of a limited number of unobservable, latent variables. The latent variables are not
generally computable as linear combinations of the original variables. In common factor analysis, it is
assumed that the variables are linearly related if not for uncorrelated random error or unique variation in
each variable; both the linear relations and the amount of unique variation can be estimated.
66
The principal components analysis of the word categories in this dataset yielded 
more than 25 components with nonzero eigenvalues. Figure 5.1 is a scree plot of the 
eigenvalues of each component, which provides information about the proportion of the 
total variance explained by each principal component. Based on the scree plot, I select the 
first 11 principal components to use in the analysis. The variance of the 11 selected 
principal components explains a total of 70 percent of the variation in the original word 
categories themselves.  
More descriptive statistics about these principal components and the variables that 
comprise them are listed in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. Based on the word categories that 
comprise them, each component has been given a descriptive name. Thus the principal 
components are titled wordcount, punctuation, wordiness, informativeness, intangibles, 
factual references, predictive words, positive words and small words and numbers. Table 
5.8 lists descriptive statistics including the means and standard deviations of these 
components.  
In the next step, the occurrence of a lawsuit is regressed on the components 
described above, after controlling for some of the common determinants of lawsuits. The 
procedure used is Chamberlain’s conditional logit model, which gives efficient estimates 
of the regression coefficients for panel data. The results of this principal component 
analysis are in Table 5.9. These results show that the fourth principal component, entitled 
‘informativeness’, is a significant robust predictor of lawsuits; since firms that provide 
informative disclosures in their 10-K documents are less likely to be the targets of 
litigation. The results hold even after controlling for current and lagged profitability, 
stock returns, governance and monitoring characteristics, and other principal components. 
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Comparing Principal Components with S&P Transparency and 
Disclosure Scores 
In Chapter 2, I discuss different measures of transparency and disclosure that have 
been proposed in the literature. Some examples of these measures are the S&P 
Transparency and Disclosure score, the AIMR score, PIN or the Probability of Informed 
Trading and Botosan’s (1997) and Francis, Nanda and Olsson’s (2005) disclosure scores. 
Of these, I compare my disclosure informativeness measure with the S&P transparency 
and disclosure score because it is one of the most comprehensive scores awarded based 
on a systematic analysis of more than 98 different attributes. In addition, many of the 
other measures have limited applicability, are not available in my sample period (for 
example, the AIMR score was discontinued in 1995), or were awarded to a very small 
sample of companies.  
I test the effectiveness of Principal Components in predicting litigation by 
comparing it to another well known measure of disclosure and transparency, namely the 
Standard and Poor’s Disclosure and Transparency score.  
First described for US companies in the paper by Patel and Dallas (2002), the 
S&P Transparency and Disclosure (T&D) rankings study was then broadened to 
encompass companies in several countries in Asia and Europe, which were ranked 
according to the method used for US companies. The aim of the S&P T&D rankings was 
to answer questions such as the following: Which companies provide the most extensive 
disclosure in their basic corporate filings? Which companies disclose above and beyond 
what the law requires? Are there significant differences among the T&D practices of 
various regions and within regions? What is the significance of the T&D rankings? And 
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how can T&D be improved? In order to assess T&D practices, the study identifies 98 
disclosure items, classified into three broad categories: (1) Ownership structure and 
investor rights, (2) Financial transparency and information disclosure, and (3) Board and 
management structure and process.  
In the US, Standard and Poor’s awards two different ranks: the Composite rank 
and the Annual Report rank. The Transparency and Disclosure (T&D) rankings on a 
composite basis include, in addition to the annual reports, the regulatory-driven 10-K and 
proxy statements. This S&P disclosure score is based on 35 accounting items, 35 
governance structures and 28 ownership structures. While U.S. composite disclosure 
levels were consistently high, disclosure levels based on annual reports alone were found 
to be much more variable.  
While comparing rankings across countries, S&P found that the U.S. (composite 
basis) and the U.K. demonstrate the highest levels of disclosure globally, with Latin 
American and Asian emerging markets comparing the least favorably. Even where 
detailed disclosure is mandated by law, companies exercise much discretion about what 
they disclose, with some companies demonstrating higher discretionary disclosure 
standards compared with local norms. 
The significance of the U.S. T&D rankings was also explored by Patel and Dallas 
(2002) by comparing Standard & Poor’s rankings with factors affecting the cost of 
capital. The authors found that companies with higher T&D rankings (on both an annual 
report and composite basis) have lower market risk. In addition, companies with higher 
T&D rankings based on annual reports alone tend to have higher price-to-book ratios. 
They conclude that companies can lower the cost of equity capital by providing higher 
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transparency and disclosure. These findings were independently confirmed by Cheng, 
Collins and Huang (2003) who conclude that the S&P T&D rankings did provide new 
information to the markets along various dimensions, and that firms with large 
differences in disclosure levels across SEC filings were received unfavorably by 
investors. 
I compare my principal components analysis of informativeness with the S&P 
T&D rankings for several reasons. The aim of the principal component analysis of the 
content analysis word categories was to come up with one or more measures that capture 
the disclosure quality of annual reports. The aim of the S&P rankings are very similar; 
the annual report ranking is a measure of the disclosure quality of the information 
contained in the annual reports whereas the composite rank is a measure of the degree of 
transparency of the company as whole, based on different types of public documents 
issued. However the S&P rankings are derived after considerable analysis of the written 
text and financial information disclosed by the company in its documents. These rankings 
are arrived at through a proprietary evaluation that incorporates the criteria that Standard 
& Poor’s Governance Services uses in its interactive corporate governance scoring 
service and hence requires considerable human input. In contrast, the content analysis of 
word categories, and the subsequent principal component analysis (including the creation 
of the ‘informativeness’ component) is meant to be easily replicable using publicly 
available data and software programs. In fact, the entire analysis can be automated. Both 
the GI and LIWC software programs are available free, and given the constituent word 
categories of each principal component (in terms of GI and LIWC word categories), it is 
easy to calculate the value of the ‘informativeness’ component and other components for 
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a given document. The annual reports on which the results are based are also publicly 
available on the SEC’s website.  
Hence, if my analysis is found to have better predictive power for litigation over 
the S&P component, then firms exhibiting poor disclosure which is likely to lead to 
litigation can be identified by investors using the process described, with the publicly 
available information at the time the annual report is released. Table 5.10 lists 
correlations between my principal components, the two S&P Transparency and 
Disclosure ranks (annual report rank or AR Rank and the Composite rank), and litigation. 
P-Values listed below each correlation coefficient measure its significance. The 
informativeness component is not significantly related to either of the S&P rank 
variables. From a univariate comparison of the correlation coefficients of the principal 
components and S&P ranks with the litigation variable, it is clear that the informativeness 
principal component is strongly and significantly negatively related to lawsuits with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.1087. The S&P ranks are not significantly correlated with the 
occurrence of a lawsuit. Table 5.11 takes this analysis further in regressing the 
occurrence of a lawsuit on both the informativeness principal component as well as the 
S&P ranks. The regression includes controls for various common determinants of 
lawsuits including size, profitability, past stock returns and the occurrence of a 
restatement. As expected, a restatement positively predicts a subsequent lawsuit, as does 
poor stock returns. Neither the composite S&P composite rank nor the AR rank is a 
significant predictor of lawsuits. However the informativeness measure, principal 
component 4, is strongly negatively related to litigation. Poor informativeness is 
associated with the risk of shareholder litigation. The results hold even after controlling 
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for monitoring and governance measures, as well as the other principal components. The 
results show that the informativeness component is a much better predictor of lawsuits 
than either of the two S&P transparency and disclosure ranks.  
To conclude, in this chapter I discussed the results of several layers of tests of the 
relationship between disclosure quality and litigation. First, I examined the relationship 
between content analysis word categories and litigation, and found that several 
dimensions of the content of 10-K reports are related to the risk of subsequent litigation. 
For example, a document that has more numerical information, more information related 
to the past and present, and fewer strong words or bold claims is less likely to be 
followed by litigation.  
In order to combine these different aspects of the information contained in 10-K 
reports and combine them into one single measure of disclosure quality, I perform 
principal components analysis of these word categories. This results in an 
‘informativeness’ principal component that captures these aspects (numerical 
information, information related to past and future events, and factual content) and is 
found to be significantly negatively related to the risk of a subsequent lawsuit.  
I test this measure of disclosure quality by comparing it to S&P Transparency and 
Disclosure ranks (T&D ranks), which are constructed from an in-depth analysis of annual 
reports and company statements. My informativeness measure is found to be a superior 
predictor of litigation. As the primary purpose of managerial disclosure is to provide 
information to satisfy shareholders, disclosure that predicts litigation can be considered 
an objective benchmark for poor disclosure. In the next section I discuss determinants of 
informative disclosure as measured by this informativeness variable.  
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Chapter 6: Does Good Governance Influence Disclosure?
In this chapter I discuss my theory and tests of the hypothesis that good 
governance and monitoring leads to better and more informative disclosure. I examine 
different aspects of governance including board size and composition, executive pay 
practices, antitakeover defenses, and monitoring by institutional shareholders and 
analysts in order to determine whether these factors can affect the quality of disclosure by 
a company. Specifically, I test whether these measures of governance systematically 
affect the types of words used in the annual reports to enhance understanding and clarity. 
The aim of these tests is to examine whether the informativeness of an annual report 
(measured using the informativeness principal component discussed in the previous 
chapter) is an outcome of the type of governance in place in the company and the degree 
of monitoring by institutional investors, analysts and board members.  
The basic test in this section involves regression of the ‘informativeness’ measure 
on governance and monitoring variables. In order to carry out these tests, I divide the 
governance and monitoring variables into two categories: the predetermined and the 
jointly determined. Governance variables such as board size and composition, the number 
of antitakeover defenses, and the executive pay practices are the ‘predetermined’ 
variables, or the ones that may be considered as exogenous in the regression equations. 
Antitakeover defenses are built into the charter of the company and are by no means 
affected by the type of disclosure in the company. Similarly, board size and composition, 
and the size and composition of CEO pay, are externally determined prior to the instance 
of the annual report-based informativeness measure. These variables are also slow-
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moving and do not change much from year to year. It is hard to imagine how the quality 
of disclosure in the annual reports may affect these variables; whereas there is clear 
causality in the opposite direction. I use OLS regressions with panel data for each 
company and year, to regress the dummy variable indicating lawsuits on this spectrum of 
governance variables, after controlling for the common determinants of lawsuits. These 
regressions reveal that governance variables do in fact affect the quality of disclosure and 
strong governance is linked to better disclosure practices as well. 
Tests involving the second category of variables, the ‘jointly determined’ 
monitoring measures, are structured differently. Institutional holdings and analyst 
coverage fall under this category of variables for which there is considerable doubt about 
the direction of causality. Good disclosure may attract institutional investors to hold a 
stock; alternatively, institutional shareholders may elicit good disclosure by the 
management. Similarly, a large analyst following may reduce the information asymmetry 
sufficiently so that companies do not need to follow extensive disclosure practices. 
Alternatively, a large analyst following may pressure management into disclosing more 
information. Given this ambiguous causality, an OLS regression does not provide the best 
test of these effects. Instead, I perform a two-stage least squares regression using 
instrumental variables for analyst coverage and institutional holdings. Results from the 
two stage least squares regression show that companies with high institutional 
shareholders and analyst coverage do have more informative disclosure practices. 
Data Description 
The dependent variable in these regressions is ‘Informativeness’, a principal 
component extracted from the content analysis of word categories obtained from the 
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LIWC and GI packages. The word categories comprising this measure are described in 
Table 5.7. More details about the extraction of this component and the procedure of 
principal component analysis are available in Chapter 5.   
Several governance and monitoring variables are used as controls in these 
regressions. Board size and the number of independent directors on the board are 
obtained from the IRRC director database. G-Index, a measure of shareholder rights, is 
also obtained from the IRRC database. G-Index is a number from 0 to 24 and its value 
indicates the number of antitakeover provisions in the firm’s charter from a list of 
possible provisions. A high value of G-Index denotes more antitakeover provisions and 
hence weak shareholder rights to take over control of the company. Bebchuk et al. (2005) 
constructed their own version of an index of antitakeover provisions called E-Index or 
Entrenchment Index. This measure is based on 6 of these 24 antitakeover provisions that 
they consider are most relevant: four constitutional provisions that prevent a majority of 
shareholders from having their way (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements 
for charter amendments), and two takeover readiness provisions that boards put in place 
to be ready for a hostile takeover (poison pills and golden parachutes).  A high value of 
the E-Index indicates a more entrenched manager. I use both the G-Index and the E-Index 
in this study. CEO compensation information is from the Execucomp database. 
Institutional investor holdings are obtained from the 13f filings in the Thomson 
institutional investor database. Analyst coverage is from I/B/E/S. I also use several 
control for the common determinants of lawsuits such as market capitalization (a proxy 
for size), past and current profitability, leverage, and other accounting information from 
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Compustat, fiscal year stock returns from CRSP, and restatement data from the GAO 
database. All regressions include controls for year and industry. I use the Fama-French 
industry codes to control for industry effects.  
Regressions using predetermined governance variables 
Table 6.1 presents results from regressions of the informativeness variable on the 
first category of predetermined governance variables, and controls. Controls include size 
(the natural log of the total market capitalization of the company), profitability (log of the 
return on equity), the occurrence of a restatement, past fiscal year stock returns, year 
dummies and Fama-French industry dummies. As is to be expected, I find that poor past 
stock returns and poor past profitability appear to be followed by less informative 10-K 
filings. In addition to this, the positive significant coefficient on the proportion of 
independent directors indicates that a higher proportion of independent directors on the 
board of directors leads to more informative disclosure practices. A larger board of 
directors also leads to significantly more informative disclosure practices. In a separate 
regression, I also control for the first principal component: document length. A longer 
document is related to poorer disclosure (as measured by informativeness). The results 
with board size and composition persist despite adding new controls. I also include the G-
Index in the regression and find that it has a significant negative impact on the quality of 
disclosure. This is consistent with more antitakeover measures resulting in entrenched 
CEOs who do not disclose information adequately. These results hold even after 
controlling for discretionary accruals which is an accounting measure of disclosure 
quality. Higher discretionary accruals are perceived by the accounting literature as a 
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strong indication of earnings management. It appears that firms that engage in earnings 
management are also likely to have poor disclosure practices.  
I also examine the effect of CEO compensation variables on the quality of 
disclosure. The compensation variables examined here are the total pay of the CEO and 
the proportion of the total pay that is incentive-based. Incentive pay is the sum of the 
Black-Scholes value of options granted to the CEO and the value of any restricted stock 
grants, divided by the total pay. Using different specifications, I do not find any 
indication that the total amount of the CEO’s compensation, or the proportion of the 
compensation that is incentive-based, affects the informativeness of disclosures by the 
company in the 10-K statements. The results in Table 6.1 are significant because 
disclosure quality is strongly influenced by the proportion of independent directors on the 
board and the degree of entrenchment of the top management measured by G-Index. This 
result indicates that CEOs who are governed by an independent board tend to disclose 
information in a timely and accurate manner in the annual reports to the satisfaction of 
shareholders. Since the informativeness measure is strongly related to the risk of 
subsequent litigation, this result provides a way that companies may reduce their 
exposure to shareholder lawsuits. Setting up an independent board might provide 
oversight over their management and elicit disclosure practices that are desired by 
shareholders. 
Regressions using jointly determined monitoring variables 
 
Table 6.2 reports the results of a two stage least squares regression in which I 
study the effects of institutional holdings and analyst coverage on disclosure 
informativeness using instrumental variables. The two stage least squares procedure is 
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used instead of a regular OLS regression in order to control for the endogeneity between 
disclosure quality and both institutional holdings as well as analyst following. 
In Panel A, I report the results of a first-stage regression on which different 
measures of institutional ownership are regressed on an S&P membership variable, which 
is used as an instrument to predict institutional ownership and thus institutional 
monitoring. Then the fitted values from this first stage regression are used as a regressor 
in the second stage regressions in which the informativeness of a company’s disclosure is 
regressed on this variable and other common determinants of lawsuits. In the second 
stage regressions reported in Panel B, I examine the determinants of informativeness by 
using it as the dependent variable in the regression. Different proxies are used for 
monitoring by shareholders including the existence of a blockholder, the number of 
blockholders and the proportion of shares held by institutions. I also include monitoring 
by analysts, measured by the number of analysts who cover the shares of a company. The 
coefficients on these different proxies for institutional blockholder monitoring and 
monitoring by analysts are all positive and significant, indicating that monitoring by both 
institutions and analysts is strongly related to the likelihood of good disclosure. The 
results hold after controlling for size, profitability and other measures that may influence 
disclosure. 
The results from these two tables point to some corporate actions that may 
promote good disclosure practices: independent boards, monitoring by analysts and 
monitoring by institutional blockholders. It is interesting to note that these characteristics, 
widely accepted as good corporate governance practices, are related to good corporate 
disclosure as well, and adopting them can reduce the risk of litigation for a company. 
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However, other practices such as performance-based compensation do not appear to have 
an effect on disclosure quality.  
In conclusion, this chapter describes the tests conducted to examine the 
determinants of the informativeness of disclosure quality in annual reports. 10-K 
documents of a company filed with the SEC are run through the GI and LIWC content 
analysis software programs, and their scores along various content dimensions are 
converted to a single loading on the principal component ‘Informativeness’. Using Two-
Stage least squares estimation to control for possible endogeneity, I find that companies 
with independent boards, a large analyst following and shares held by institutions and 
blockholders are more likely to have good disclosure practices. The results in these 
regressions imply shareholders can induce better disclosure from management through 
oversight by boards, analysts and institutions, and not through managerial compensation. 
This result reveals yet another benefit of monitoring by boards and institutional 
blockholders that the academic literature has not examined closely. Monitoring not only 
has the direct effect of shareholder oversight of managerial actions, but it also has the 
indirect effect of inducing good communication flow between managers (agents) and 
shareholders (their principals). 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This dissertation examines the substitution effects between monitoring and 
lawsuits; and the mechanism by which strong governance and monitoring mitigate the 
agency problem: disclosure. The firm is characterized by an asymmetry of information 
between managers and shareholders, one manifestation of the agency problem. 
Insufficient, untimely or uninformative disclosures by management exacerbate this 
agency problem. This may result in dissatisfied shareholders who resort to litigation in 
order to reclaim the losses they have suffered due to misleading or false statements by 
management. Improper disclosure by management may also be a conscious attempt by 
management to cover their tracks from fraudulent or inappropriate activities. Hence good 
governance and monitoring may enhance the quality of disclosure which prevents 
shareholder litigation.  
I examine this hypothesis in several parts. The first section examines the 
substitutability of litigation and monitoring (by institutional shareholders and 
independent boards) and finds that monitoring is a substitute for litigation. The 
theoretical model in Chapter 3 describes the shareholders’ decision as one of strong 
internal monitoring or corrective measures such as litigation. Shareholders of a company 
have the option to set strong internal controls such as independent boards, good 
compensation practices, and analyst coverage. These measures help keep managers 
accountable to shareholders and keep their actions transparent, reducing the likelihood of 
securities litigation. The tests in Chapter 4 verify the empirical implications of this 
theoretical model. Using both regular logistic regressions as well as two stage least 
80
squares regression, I confirm that monitoring by independent boards and institutional 
shareholders is a substitute to securities litigation. The two stage least squares regression 
controls for the endogenous nature of monitoring by institutional shareholders by using 
membership in the S&P 500 as an instrument for it. This instrument is also found to be 
significantly negatively related to the occurrence of a lawsuit even after controlling for 
the common determinants of lawsuits.  
The next essay in Chapter 5 examines poor disclosure as a trigger to litigation, 
and develops a measure to quantify the informativeness of disclosure in 10-K filings. In 
this section, I analyze text in 10-K filings with the SEC using content analysis packages, 
and use the resulting word counts in different word categories to predict lawsuits. My 
findings are that filings which are long but contain a smaller proportion of informative 
words such as numbers, past and future related words are more likely to precede 
shareholder lawsuits. I use both unconditional logit regressions and Chamberlain 
conditional regression models to verify my results. In order to consolidate the different 
word categories and develop a single measure that captures the quality of information, I 
use principal components analysis of the word categories given by the LIWC and GI 
content analysis packages, and capture the different dimensions of the word categories in 
11 orthogonal principal components. The principal component ‘informativeness’ is found 
to be a strong predictor of the risk of securities litigation in the subsequent year. In logit 
regressions predicting a lawsuit using various principal components, informativeness has 
a significant negative coefficient, even after controlling for other principal components, 
accounting measures and governance and monitoring mechanisms in place in the 
company. Here again, I perform a robustness check using conditional and unconditional 
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logit regression methodologies, which give consistent results. Further, I compare this 
measure of informativeness with another measure of transparency and good disclosure 
that has been proposed in the literature, the S&P transparency and disclosure rank. These 
ranks are awarded based on comprehensive corporate governance analysis and rating, and 
the annual report rank is based on disclosure of corporate governance practices, board 
structure and other corporate information in the annual reports. These ranks are not 
closely related with the content analysis word count results from the 10-Ks, or with the 
principal components. In a horse race between the principal components and the S&P 
ranks, the informativeness principal component is better at predicting litigation, compared 
to the S&P rankings. This predictive power holds even after controlling for other 
common determinants of lawsuits, and for governance and monitoring mechanisms. 
Surprisingly, a high S&P rank for transparency does not work to prevent litigation. It is 
unrelated to litigation risk after controlling for factors that predict litigation. On the other 
hand, the informativeness principal component is a good negative predictor of the risk of 
litigation because companies with more informative annual reports are much less likely to 
be sued by shareholders. 
The last essay in Chapter 6 examines the determinants of informative disclosure 
in 10-K filings by companies. The hypothesis tested is whether strong governance and 
monitoring lead to more informative disclosure. I separate the governance and monitoring 
mechanisms into completely exogenous mechanisms and possibly endogenous 
mechanisms and estimate the effect of each group separately. Using logistic regressions, I 
conclude that exogenous variables like the number of antitakeover measures and the 
proportion of non-independent directors on the board are significantly negatively related 
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to the likelihood of a lawsuit. In order to establish the impact of the possibly endogenous 
variables like blockholder monitoring and analyst monitoring, I use a two stage least 
squares approach using an instrumental variable, with similar results. Strong monitoring 
by institutional shareholders and analysts results in a better quality of disclosure in annual 
reports.  
This research has important implications for research in governance and corporate 
disclosure. Content analysis programs that are now beginning to be used in finance are a 
great tool to examine the nature of managerial disclosures, and offer the added advantage 
of being programmable and automated. Thus the disclosure quality index I create can be 
easily computed from publicly available filings and provides an effective description of 
different facets of the annual report. The use of this disclosure quality index to predict 
possible fraud and litigation can represent a significant addition to the body of work that 
examines disclosure, in the finance, accounting and legal fields. The analysis of the 
determinants of informative disclosure can help investors create conditions in firms that 
are conducive to these types of disclosure by management. 
To summarize, I find that monitoring by independent boards, analysts and 
institutional shareholders helps to enhance the informativeness of corporate disclosure 
which can result in less litigation. Since litigation is a costly mechanism for shareholders, 
this study points to alternatives that may be equally effective at a lower cost. The results 
of these studies underscore the importance of monitoring and activism by shareholders as 
well as of good governance structures within a company, in order to mitigate the agency 
problem and avoid costly shareholder litigation. 
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Appendix A 
Imperfect information model 
Equilibrium 1: Sue if restate =1, mixed strategy if restate=0
Probability that a manager commits fraud = T. When the shareholder sees that 
restate=0, she chooses s=1 with a probability of U and s=0 with probability (1-U).  
We can now get the following posterior probability in terms of T as: 
Pr (F=1/r=0) = 
)0Pr().0/0Pr()1Pr().1/0Pr(
)1Pr().1/0Pr(
===+===
===
ffrffr
ffr
= (1 )
2
µ 
µ  µ

+ 
The probabilities with which the agents undertake each action can be incorporated 
into the payoff table as follows: 
Shareholder’s decision 
Manager’s decision 
r = 0 case S=1 
with 
prob. U
S=0 
with prob. 
(1-U)
F=1 with 
prob.  
(1 )
2
µ 
µ  µ

+ 
N –
p, 
 -N
+ p – a
N ,
- N
F=0 with 
prob.  
(1 )
2
 µ
µ  µ

+ 
0, 
 - a 
0, 
0
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Given these probabilities, there are 2 conditions both of which have to be fulfilled 
for this to be a mixed strategy equilibrium.  
The shareholder is indifferent between choosing S=1 and S=0, given the mixed 
strategy employed by the manager. 
(1 )
2
µ 
µ  µ

+ 
(-N + p – a) + (1- (1 )
2
µ 
µ  µ

+ 
)(-a) = (1 )
2
µ 
µ  µ

+ 
(-N) + (1-
(1 )
2
µ 
µ  µ

+ 
)(0) 
This gives us the condition  
T =
(1 ) (1 2 )
a
p a

   
 (1.1)  
The manager is indifferent between choosing F=1 and F=0, given the mixed 
strategy employed by the shareholder. 
U (N – p) + (1- U)( N) = U (0) + (1- U) (0) 
This gives us the value of U.
U =
p
 (1.2) 
To completely define the equilibrium, we also need to specify what happens when 
the value of r=1 is realized. The value of T is the same in this case, as ‘T’ denotes the 
unconditional probability of committing fraud. We can thus derive the posterior 
probabilities once again in this case as follows: 
Pr (F=1/r=1) = 
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
If the shareholder chooses S=1, her total utility is  
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1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
(-N + p – a) + (1 - 
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
) (-a)  
If she chooses S=0, then her utility is zero.   
Substituting the value of T from (1.1), we get that the utility to the shareholder 
from choosing S=1 is greater than the utility to the shareholder from choosing S=0. Thus 
under this equilibrium, if the shareholder sees r = 1, in equilibrium she will choose S=1. 
(1.3) 
Equilibrium 2: Don’t sue if restate=0, mixed strategy if restate=1
Once again we consider first the mixed strategy case where the shareholder sees 
that restate=1. In this case, suppose she chooses S=1 with a probability of W and S=0 with 
probability (1-W). Denote the unconditional probability that the manager commits fraud 
by T. We get 
Pr (F=1/r=1) =     
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
The table of payoffs can be rewritten as: 
Shareholder’s decision 
Manager’s decision 
r = 1 case S=1 
w/ prob W
S=0 w/ 
prob. (1-W)
F=1 with prob. 
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
N – p,
-N + p
– a
N , - N
F=0 with prob.  
1- 
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
0,  - a 0, 0 
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The 2 conditions both of which have to be fulfilled for this to be a mixed strategy 
equilibrium are given below. 
The shareholder is indifferent between choosing S=1 and S=0, given the mixed 
strategy employed by the manager. 
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
(-N+p–a) + (1-
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
)(-a) = 
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
(-N) +
(1-
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
)(0) 
This gives us the condition  
T = (1 )
(1 2 )
a
a p

 

 +
(2.1)  
The manager is indifferent between choosing F=1 and F=0, given the mixed 
strategy employed by the shareholder. 
W (N – p) + (1- W)( N) = W (0) + (1- W) (0) 
This gives us the value of W as W =
p
 (2.2) 
When the value of r=0 is realized, we again get a pure strategy response described 
below. The shareholder’s payoffs are: 
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If S=1, utility to the shareholder is = 
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
(-N + B – a) + (1 -
1 2
µ
 µ µ  +
)(-a)  
If S=0, utility to the shareholder is zero.  
Substituting the value of T from (2.1), we get that the utility to the shareholder 
from choosing S=1 on seeing a signal r=0 is less than zero. Hence the shareholder will 
choose S=0 if she sees r = 0.         (2.3) 
(2.1), (2.2), (2.3) together define this equilibrium. 
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Appendix B 
Sample constituents of word categories 
 
Some content analysis word categories used in the analysis are listed here along with selected words that constitute
these categories. The number of words constituting each of these categories is also listed in parenthesis. These word
categories are from the content analysis software General Inquirer. The General Inquirer builds word categories from
four sources: (1) the Harvard IV-4 dictionary, (2) the Lasswell value dictionary, (3) several categories recently
constructed, and (4) "marker" categories primarily developed as a resource for disambiguation, but also available to
users. There are two word categories each for the ‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’ words; these do have several overlapping
words but differ in the dictionaries they use. Certain words may have several meanings depending on the context, these
are assigned ‘word senses’, and different word senses may fall under different word categories. For example, the words
‘aid’, ‘allow’ and ‘ally’ on this list may be used in different senses: noun or verb. Their usage in a sentence affects what
word category they are assigned to.
Positive Negative Positive 2 Negative 2 Strong Weak 
(1914 words) (2293 words) (1046 words) (1165 words) (1902 words) (756 words) 
Abide Abandon Advantageous Adverse Adept Affliction 
Able Abate Affection Afflict Adeptness Anxiety 
Abound Abdicate Affectionate Affliction Adjust#1 Apathetic 
Absolve Abhor Affirm Against Administer Apathy 
Absorbent Abject Agree#1 Aggravate Administration#1 Apologetic 
Absorption Abnormal Agreeable Aggression Administrative Apologize 
Abundance Abolish Agreement Aggressive Administrator Apology 
Abundant Abominable Aid#1 Aggravate Admiration Apprehensive 
Accede Abrasive Alive Agitate Admirer Ashamed 
Accentuate Abrupt Alliance Agitation Admonish Asleep 
Accept Abscond Allied Allegation Adorn Astray 
Acceptable Absence Allow#1 Ambiguity Adroit Asunder 
Acceptance 
Absent-
Minded Ally#1 Ambivalent Adroitly Atrophy 
Accessible Absentee Ameliorate Amiss Adulation Average#1 
Accession Abuse Ample Antagonistic Adult#1 Avert 
Acclaim Abyss Appeal#3 Arbitrary Advance#1 Avoid 
Acclamation Accident Applause Argue Advantage Avoidance 
Accolade Acrimonious  Appoint#1 Artificial Advantageous Awkward 
Accommodate Adulterate Appreciable Attack Affinity Awkwardness 
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Figure 3.1
Extensive form of imperfect information game between shareholders and management
The following figure is an extensive-form diagram of an imperfect information sequential game played between
shareholders of a company and the manager of the company. Nature is also considered to be a player in the game and
selects an action with some probability; this is the conventional game theoretic depiction of a random choice. Each cell
represents a decision taken by one of the players: the shareholders, the manager or nature. The arrows depict the
outcome of the decision. A dotted line represents an information set. At the end nodes, payoffs to the manager and
shareholders are represented by values in parenthesis separated by a comma. S represents whether a lawsuit is chosen,
F whether fraud is committed, and r whether a restatement occurs or not. A normal-form representation of this game
with the same payoffs is presented in Chapter 3. See Appendix A for further details of the solution to this game.
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Figure 4.1
Securities class action lawsuits over time
This figure is a graphical depiction of the number of securities class action lawsuits filed in the post-reform act period.
It covers the years 1996 to 2005 and includes all types of securities lawsuits during the period. All data is obtained from
the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, jointly maintained by Cornerstone Research. The large spike in
2001 is due to an unprecedented number of IPO allocation based lawsuits that were brought to court in that year. This
graph includes securities class action lawsuits brought against private as well as public companies, as well as lawsuits
brought against investment banks or traders for improper IPO practices. Not all the lawsuits depicted in this graph are
in the sample used for regressions. Only lawsuits against public firms for which other data and control variables could
be found are used in the regressions. IPO allocation lawsuits are excluded as far as possible.
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Figure 4.2
Change in number of securities class action lawsuits filed by public companies over time
This figure depicts all the securities class action lawsuits that have occurred in the years 1996 to 2005, in the post
securities reform act period, for public companies only. The data includes all types of securities lawsuits during the
period and is obtained from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, jointly maintained by Cornerstone
Research. The large spike in 2001 is due to an unprecedented number of IPO allocation based lawsuits that were
brought to court in that year. The growth in lawsuits is also fitted using a polynomial fit line. I also test to see if the
number of lawsuits filed against public companies has decreased post Sarbanes Oxley. Since Sarbanes Oxley applies
only to public companies, one may not expect to see a change in the lawsuits filed against private companies. Below
the figure are the results of a Chow test for a structural break in the occurrence of lawsuits post-Sarbanes Oxley. I test
for structural breaks at different dates in 2002, and all these tests indicate the presence of a structural break and a
reduction in the number of lawsuits against public companies since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002.
Chow test for structural breaks  
(reduction in number of lawsuits) 
Time 
F
Value P- Value 
Jan-02 30.74 <.0001 
Jun-02 17.98 <.0001 
Dec-02 19.9 <.0001 
N=42338  
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Figure 5.1
Eigen values of largest principal components
The graph is a scree plot containing eigen values of the principal components extracted from the word categories as
described in Chapter 5. The variance explained by each principal component is the eigen value of that component
divided by the total of the eigen values. Numbers next to each point on the graph are indexes of the principal
components. The names and constituents of the principal components are available in Table 5.7 and descriptive
statistics are available in Table 5.8.
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Table 4.1
Industries with the most securities class action lawsuits
This table lists the industries (defined by 4-digit SIC codes) which have the maximum number of securities class action
lawsuits in the sample period. It covers the years 1996 to 2005 and includes all types of securities lawsuits during the
period. All data is obtained from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, jointly maintained by
Cornerstone Research. Industry definitions are obtained from the SIC industry descriptions.
Rank Industry 4-digit SIC code Number of lawsuits
1 Prepackaged Software 7372 35
2 Pharmaceuticals 2834 21
3 Computer programming,data processing 7370 12
4 Semiconductors 3674 10
5 Electric Services 4911 10
6 Electric and other services combined 4931 9
7 Computer communications equipment 3576 8
8 Telephone and telegraph apparatus 3661 8
9 Radio, TV broadcasting 3663 8
10 State commercial banks 6022 7
Table 4.2
Top ten allegations in securities class action lawsuits
This table lists the top ten allegations made by plaintiffs against management while filing a securities class action
lawsuit. Lawsuits occurring in the years 1996 to 2005 are included in the sample. All data is obtained from the Stanford
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, jointly maintained by Cornerstone Research. The allegation terminology is as
listed in the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, for which data are obtained directly from lawsuit filings.
Rank Allegation
1 Misleading/False Statements
2 Failure to disclose relevant information
3 Disclosure violation
4 Breach of fiduciary responsibility
5 Registration proxy statement
6 Insider trading
7 Revenue restatement
8 IPO
9 Improper accounting practice
10 Revenue recognition
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Table 4.3
Ten largest settlements in securities class action lawsuits
This table describes the evidence that securities class action lawsuits can be a big financial burden to the company,
even if they do not go to trial. A very large proportion of securities lawsuits never go to trial and are instead settled out
of court. The table lists only settlements after the Reform Act was passed. Thus only settlements from lawsuits
occurring in the years 1996 to 2005 are included in the sample. These numbers are as of February 13, 2006 and any
additional settlements made after that date have not been included in these figures. The figure for all other large
settlements given in the last row is the total of all other settlements whose amount is in excess of $100 million. All data
is obtained from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, jointly maintained by Cornerstone Research.
Rank Issuer Settlement amount
Percentage of
Valuation
1 Enron $7,160.50 21.12%
2 WorldCom $6,156.30 18.16%
3 Cendant $3,528.00 10.41%
4 AOL Time Warner $2,500.00 7.37%
5 Nortel Networks $2,473.60 7.30%
6 Royal Ahold $1,091.00 3.22%
7 IPO Allocation Litigation $1,000.00 2.95%
8 McKesson HBOC $960.00 2.83%
9 Lucent Technologies $673.40 2.19%
10 Bristol-Myers Squibb $574.00 1.69%
All other large settlements $7,786.50 22.97%
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Table 4.4
Pearson correlation coefficients between lawsuits and monitoring variables
This table lists Pearson correlation coefficients between the different variables used in the study described in Chapter 4.
Panel A contains the correlation of different proxy variables for institutional monitoring with the occurrence of a
lawsuit. The occurrence of a lawsuit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a lawsuit has occurred in that firm-
year. Monitoring variables are generally considered in the period one year prior to the year of the lawsuit. Panel B
contains correlation coefficients between firm characteristics and the occurrence of a lawsuit. The P-Values in both
Panel A and Panel B represent the statistical significance of the correlation coefficients.
Panel A
Variable Correlation with lawsuits P-Value N
Blockholder existence -0.0648 0.0009 4496
Institutional blockholder existence -0.1254 <.0001 4496
Number of block holders -0.0434 0.0794 4496
Proportion of independent directors -0.0771 <.0001 2681
Total directors -0.1675 <.0001 2681
CEO director -0.0324 0.0924 4496
Number of institutional block holders -0.1302 <.0001 4496
Total holdings by institutions -0.2433 <.0001 4496
Herfindahl concentration of holdings -0.0521 0.0075 2635
Panel B
Variable Correlation with lawsuits P-Value N
Log(marketcap) 0.4451 <.0001 3842
Log(ROE) -0.2089 <.0001 3712
CEO Salary 0.0875 <.0001 3605
CEO Option pay 0.1415 <.0001 3580
CEO Total pay 0.1170 <.0001 3580
Shares owned by CEO 0.0082 0.7579 1429
Dividend yield -0.0201 0.2278 3586
Black-Scholes volatility of stock 0.0434 0.0124 3322
Tangible assets (PPE/Sales) -0.0122 0.5067 2970
Total CEO pay/ Sales 0.0082 0.6264 3563
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Table 4.5
Characteristics of restatements
The following table reports the results of logit regressions with restatement as the dependent variable. The restatement
variable takes a value of 1 for firms that had a restatement of financial statements for that year and 0 otherwise. The
firm characteristics include the natural logarithm of the firm’s sales, compensation variables (total compensation and
incentive-based pay of the CEO and the top five highest-paid executives of the company), board characteristics (the
natural logarithm of the total number of directors on the board and the proportion of independent directors on the
board) and the firm’s dividend yield. The regression also includes year dummies. Incentive-based compensation is
defined as the total of the Black-Scholes value of option grants and restricted stock grants, divided by the total pay. P-
Values are given below each coefficient in italics. Compensation characteristics are obtained from Execucomp and all
other firm data is from the Compustat database.
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Sales) 0.1444 0.1385 0.1127 0.1795 0.1666
0.0061 0.0095 0.0612 0.0011 0.0062
Total Pay CEO 2.5149 0.4954
0.5215 0.9235
Incentive Pay CEO 0.4943 0.4538 0.5353
0.079 0.1165 0.0937
Total Pay Top5 9.4979 -2.1894
0.4486 0.8873
Incentive Pay Top5 1.0394 0.9512
0.0026 0.0099
Ln(Totaldirectors) -0.1273 -0.1486
0.452 0.3689
Prop. Indep. Directors -0.5449 0.4013
0.2572 0.3194
Dividend Yield -0.5458
0.8153
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10108 10108 5332 10260 6107
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Table 4.6
Differences in monitoring levels between lawsuit and no-lawsuit subsamples
This table reports the results of univariate tests of differences between lawsuit firms and firms which have not
experienced a lawsuit. Panel A compares mean values of monitoring variables and Panel B compares mean values of
firm characteristics and CEO entrenchment variables, between two sets of firms. The first set of firms are those which
have experienced a securities class action lawsuit in the sample period, and the second set of firms are control firms
which have not experienced lawsuits. Blockholder existence is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an
institutional blockholder exists who owns 5% or more of the stock of the company. The last column reports P-Values
from a Wilcoxon test comparing the mean values of the two sets of firms. Compensation data in Panel B is reported in
thousands of dollars, as is Total Sales, Total Assets and Tangible Assets.
Wilcoxon tests for differences in monitoring between lawsuit and no-lawsuit firms 
 Panel A    
No lawsuit firms Lawsuit firms 
Wilcoxon 
test P-value 
 Number of blockholders 2.0222 2.1973 0.0888 
Number of indep. directors 7.1676 5.9770 <.0001 
 Total directors 10.4814 9.1593 <.0001 
 Proportion of indep. directors 0.6816 0.6500 0.0001 
 Blockholder existence 0.7312 0.6491 <.0001 
 Number of analysts 10.1267 7.8827 <.0001 
 Total holdings by institutions 0.5270 0.4294 <.0001 
Observations   5251 1462   
Panel B    
 
Wilcoxon tests for differences in firm characteristics between lawsuit and no-lawsuit 
firms 
 No lawsuit firms Lawsuit firms 
Wilcoxon 
test P-value 
Entrenchment CEO salary 684.6332 871.3469 <.0001 
CEO bonus 840.2409 1408.2200 0.0785 
 CEO total pay 5245.6200 17946.1200 <.0001 
 CEO option pay 2486.9400 13769.1700 <.0001 
 Top 5 total pay 8449.7800 24380.2100 0.0041 
 Top 5 option pay 3970.3300 19250.1900 <.0001 
 Dividends per share 0.5892 0.2831 <.0001 
Firm 
characteristics Sales 5940.4100 14118.6900 <.0001 
 Employees 22.9979 40.3105 0.0024 
 ROA 4.1170 2.3179 0.0004 
 Assets 18081.0800 24288.0600 <.0001 
Complexity PPE (Tangible assets ) 403.0990 462.2820 <.0001 
 Stdev. of analyst forecasts 0.4208 0.3049 <.0001 
 Black-Scholes Volatility 0.3463 0.3871 <.0001 
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Table 4.7
Logistic regressions of the occurrence of a lawsuit on monitoring variables
The following table reports the results of logit regressions with lawsuits as the dependent variable. The lawsuit variable takes a value of 1 for firms that had a securities
class action lawsuit in the year and 0 otherwise. This is a panel data regression with the standard errors adjusted for clustering, or multiple observations per firm. The
independent variables include the following controls: log of marketcap of the firm as a control for size, log of return on equity both current and lagged, the previous fiscal
year’s stock returns and the occurrence of a restatement. I also control for discretionary accruals which is considered to be a sign of earnings manipulation, and may thus
trigger a lawsuit. Monitoring variables include institutional blockholder monitoring (a dummy value that takes a value of ‘1’ if an institutional blockholder exists), board
member monitoring (the percentage of independent directors on the board), and analyst monitoring (number of analysts and the standard deviation of forecasts by
analysts). The blockholder dummy is also interacted with (1- discretionary accruals). This interaction term takes a high value if there exists at least one institutional
blockholder, and the firm does not show signs of earnings manipulation. The regression also includes year and Fama-French industry dummies. P-Values and marginal
effects (slope of the regression line for an average value of the covariates) are given adjacent to the coefficient estimates.
Dep.
Variable: Suit Coefficient
P-
Value
Marginal
effect Coefficient
P-
Value
Marginal
effect Coefficient
P-
Value
Marginal
effect Coefficient
P-
Value
Marginal
effect
Intercept -0.77 0.3381 -7.7871 <.0001 -1.457 0.1078 -5.4495 <.0001
Restatement 0.9068 0.0001 1.383 <.0001 0.4251 0.0459 0.8312 0.0046
Log(Size) 0.0325 0.3512 5.1283 0.3573 <.0001 5.1171 0.0107 0.8075 5.1728 0.3085 <.0001 3.5788
Log(ROE) -1.0594 <.0001 0.0145 -2.3141 0.0011 0.0144 -1.3961 <.0001 0.0146 -2.5525 <.0001 0.0101
Fisc year
return 0.104 0.2933 0.011 0.7258 0.0002 0.0109 0.0426 0.6485 0.0111 0.1044 0.2915 0.0076
Disc.
Accruals -0.0001 0.2244
Blockholder
dummy -0.4875 <.0001 -0.4151 0.0186
Blockholder x (1-Disc.acc.) -0.0002 0.0287
PC
independent
directors -1.1829 0.0021 0.1641 -1.6764 <.0001 0.1642
Number of
analysts -0.0058 0.5227 2.3376
Stdev of
analyst
forecasts 0.7799 0.1158 0.0953 -2.5492 0.1288 0.0943
Year
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Fama-French
industry
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6731 6731 6731 6731
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Table 4.8
Tests for endogeneity between lawsuit and monitoring variables
This table contains the results of tests for endogeneity of the blockholder variables in the lawsuit regression. The test
examines if the error term is correlated with this institutional holding variable when lawsuits are regressed on either a
blockholder dummy variable, or the proportion of shares held by institutions. Results of the test show that when either
of these proxies is used to measure monitoring by institutions, an OLS does not result in unbiased estimates of the
coefficient and a Two-Stage Least Squares regression method is preferable to OLS.
Test for endogeneity: Choosing between OLS and 2SLS regressions
Possibly endogenous variables Comparing To DF Test Statistic
P-Value ( -
squared)
Blockholder existence and lawsuits OLS 2SLS 2 4.871 <0.0001
Institutional holdings and lawsuits OLS 2SLS 2 6.842 <0.0001
N 21973
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Table 4.9
Two-stage least squares estimation of the relationship between monitoring and lawsuits
This table shows the results of a Two-Stage Least Squares regression in which membership in the S&P index is used as an instrument for institutional monitoring. This
instrument is used to perform logistic regressions of the occurrence of a lawsuit on the institutional monitoring variable. First and second stage regression results are
given in Panel A and B respectively. The three first stage regressions have as a dependent variable the proportion of shares held by institutions, the existence of a
blockholder, and the number of block holders respectively. In all these three regressions, the dependent variable is S&P index membership and the coefficients in the
table are the coefficients on this variable. P-Values and the adjusted R-squared are also displayed. In the second stage regressions, the occurrence of a lawsuit is the
dependent variable and the various independent variables are listed in the table. These are the same as used in Table 4.6 except that the first stage predicted values are
substituted for the institutional monitoring variables: Proportion of institutional holdings, Blockholder existence and number of block holders. P-Values are given along
with the coefficients.
Panel A: First stage regression using S&P instrument
Dep.Variable Coefficient
P-
Value R-Squared
Prop. Inst. Holding 0.2817 <.0001 0.0001
Blockholder 0.0045 0.028 0.0002
# Block holders 0.9466 <.0001 0.0163
Panel B: Second stage regression using S&P instrument
Dep.Var. : Suit Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value
Intercept -0.2105 <.0001 -0.1305 <.0001 -0.1803 <.0001
Restatement 0.1721 <.0001 0.1570 <.0001 0.1570 <.0001
Ln(Size) 0.0131 <.0001 0.0131 <.0001 0.0131 <.0001
Ln(ROE) -0.0082 0.0074 -0.0082 0.0078 -0.0082 0.0103
Lag Ln(ROE) -0.0048 0.1356 -0.0037 0.244 -0.0037 0.2615
Fisc.yr. return -0.0358 <.0001 -0.0349 <.0001 -0.0349 <.0001
Prop. Inst. Holding -0.0782 <.0001
Blockholder -0.1511 <.0001
# Block holders -0.0239 <.0001
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
FF industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 22072 22072 22072
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Table 4.10
Marginal effects of a restatement on the probability of a lawsuit
The following table reports descriptive statistics for marginal changes in the value of the ‘suit’ variable when a
restatement occurs, for different types of firms. The first two rows report average marginal effect on the probability of a
lawsuit for firms with and without institutional blockholders. An institutional blockholder is an institutional investor
holding 5% or more of the shares of the company. The rows also report the minimum and maximum marginal effects as
well as the number of observations. The next two rows report the marginal effects of a restatement on the probability of
a lawsuit for two groups of firms according to their proportion of institutional holdings. This is calculated as the
percentage of institutional shareholdings divided by the total shares outstanding.
Subsamples Mean Minimum Maximum N
Firms with institutional blockholder 0.0800 0.0058 0.7621 3623
Firms without institutional blockholder 0.1441 0.0125 0.6552 3167
Firms with above-average proportion of institutional
holdings 0.0605 0.0000 0.4873 3538
Firms with below-average proportion of institutional
holdings 0.0944 0.0145 0.7060 7668
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Table 4.11
Changes in institutional holdings of shares in lawsuit firms over time
The following table reports results from an event-time regression in which the proportion of shares held by investors is
the dependent variable. All firms included in the sample are firms which have had securities class action lawsuits
during the sample period. Year 0 refers to the year of the lawsuit, years -1, -2 etc. refer to years prior to the lawsuit and
years +1,+2 etc refer to years after the lawsuit has been filed. Other than using year and Fama-French industry
dummies to control for these effects, I also control for some common determinants of institutional holdings. These
include size (logged market capitalization), logged book to market, leverage, stock returns during the prior year, and
share turnover or liquidity. In addition, I control for the occurrence of a restatement and for earnings manipulation
using discretionary accruals.
Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 0.4223 <.0001  -0.8902 <.0001  -0.6484 <.0001 
Year -5 0.0271 0.2374  0.0125 0.568  0.0407 0.5658 
Year -4 0.0488 0.0282  0.0301 0.1349  -0.1055 0.1386 
Year -3 0.0524 0.0179  0.0261 0.202  -0.0752 0.1762 
Year -2 0.0189 0.3779  0.0333 0.0793  -0.0997 0.0522 
Year -1 -0.0066 0.7483  0.0082 0.6511  -0.1455 0.0085 
Year 0 -0.0568 0.0031  -0.0320 0.0493  -0.2155 0.0005 
Year + 1 -0.0590 0.0007  -0.0435 0.006  -0.0370 0.6311 
Year +2 -0.0417 0.01  -0.0185 0.2451  0.0185 0.8099 
Year +3 -0.0457 0.0025  -0.0026 0.8649  -0.1190 0.3296 
Ln(Marketcap)    0.0666 <.0001  0.0606 <.0001 
Ln(B/M)    0.0347 <.0001  0.0528 0.0002 
Fisc. Year 
returns    0.0287 <.0001  0.0379 0.0013 
Leverage    0.0001 0.407  0.0036 0.0966 
Share turnover    0.0846 0.0036  0.0447 0.1596 
Restatement       -0.0027 0.9257 
Disc. Accruals             0.0000 0.0008 
Calendar year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes 
FF industry dummies Yes   Yes   Yes 
N (clusters)  791     781     696 
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Table 4.12
Does monitoring directly deter fraud? Logistic regressions using matched sample firms
This table reports the results of a matched-sample (pairwise) regression using 70 firms which were investigated by the SEC for alleged fraud (the sample firms). These
sample firms are then matched with 70 control firms, which are firms in the same SIC 4-digit industry code closest in size and past profitability to the sample firms in the
years before the alleged fraud took place. I test whether strong monitoring deters fraud by regressing the occurrence of fraud on various monitoring variables and
controls. Monitoring variables include monitoring by institutional investors (proportion of shares held by institutions), monitoring by boards (total number of directors on
the board of a company, and the proportion of inside directors on the board), and monitoring by analysts (number of analyst forecasts). I also control for size (log of
market capitalization of the company), profitability (logged ROE), leverage and discretionary accruals.
Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value
Discretionary
accruals 0.0003 0.7164 0.0005 0.7912 0.0003 0.6377 0.0002 0.6041 0.0001 0.8482
Ln (Marketcap) 2.6162 0.1492 3.0739 0.2445 0.7067 0.0335 0.7240 0.0755 1.0344 0.1054
Ln(ROE) -13.6595 0.2615 -15.6471 0.3380 -0.3917 0.5172 -0.2950 0.6236 -0.6928 0.5102
Leverage 0.6756 0.5399 1.1868 0.4931 0.3321 0.2679 0.3086 0.3353 -0.0052 0.9920
PC indep
directors 1.0513 0.7663 1.5184 0.7096 -0.7232 0.7162
Total directors 0.3231 0.4347
Block holders 0.0637 0.5044
Institutional
holdings
# analysts 0.0589 0.2421
N 140 140 140 140 140
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Table 5.1 
Correlation coefficients between sets of LIWC word categories 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients for different word categories available in the content analysis
package LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) using the output from the entire dataset of 10-K reports filed with
the SEC in the years 1993-2005. P-Values for the correlation coefficients are reported below the coefficients. WPS is
Words per sentence. All category outputs barring Wordcount and Words per sentence are standardized by dividing
them by the total wordcount.
LIWC word
categories Wordcount WPS Pronouns Numbers Tentative Certain Past Present Future
Wordcount 1 0.4766 0.0357 -0.4457 0.6258 0.3046 -0.3616 -0.2882 0.5426
<.0001 0.0599 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
WPS 0.4765 1 -0.1018 -0.2030 0.5355 0.2310 -0.2562 -0.3738 0.3913
<.0001 0.0195 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Pronouns 0.0357 -0.1018 1 -0.1098 0.0084 0.0025 -0.1615 0.2829 0.0248
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0653 0.5823 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Numbers -0.4457 -0.2030 -0.1098 1 -0.7373 -0.4809 0.3303 -0.0491 -0.7443
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Tentative 0.6257 0.5355 0.0084 -0.7373 1 0.5131 -0.4588 -0.2797 0.8683
<.0001 <.0001 0.0653 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Certain 0.3046 0.2310 0.0025 -0.4809 0.5131 1 -0.2305 -0.1190 0.3985
<.0001 <.0001 0.5823 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Past -0.3615 -0.2562 -0.1615 0.3303 -0.4588 -0.2305 1 0.0666 -0.4325
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Present -0.2881 -0.3738 0.2829 -0.0491 -0.2798 -0.1191 0.0666 1 -0.1756
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Future 0.5426 0.3914 0.0248 -0.7443 0.8684 0.3985 -0.4326 -0.1756 1
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.002
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Table 5.2 
Correlation coefficients between sets of GI word categories 
 
This table reports the Karl Pearson correlation coefficients for different word categories available in the content
analysis package General Inquirer (GI), using the output from the entire dataset of 10-K reports filed with the SEC in
the years 1993-2005. P-Values for the correlation coefficients are reported below the coefficients. WPS is Words per
sentence. All category outputs barring the wordcount and words per sentence are standardized by dividing them by the
total wordcount. Two different measures of positive and negative words are used which use inputs from different
dictionaries.
Wordcount Positive Negative Positive 2 Negative 2 Leftovers Strong Weak Overst. Underst.
Wordcount 1 0.1075 0.0568 0.2042 -0.0767 -0.2319 -0.2837 -0.1733 0.6000 -0.1833
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Positive 0.1075 1 -0.0042 0.9050 -0.0120 -0.2900 0.1732 0.1189 0.1349 0.0824
<.0001 0.3547 <.0001 0.0087 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Negative 0.0568 -0.0042 1 -0.0492 0.9413 -0.2000 0.0766 0.5204 0.0610 0.2740
<.0001 0.3547 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Positive 2 0.2042 0.9050 -0.0492 1 -0.0784 -0.3516 0.1435 -0.0373 0.2524 0.0365
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Negative 2 -0.0767 -0.0120 0.9413 -0.0784 1 -0.1241 0.1668 0.5566 -0.1171 0.3108
<.0001 0.0087 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Leftovers -0.2319 -0.2900 -0.2000 -0.3516 -0.1241 1 -0.2722 0.0142 -0.4855 -0.0585
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0019 0.0019 <.0001 <.0001
Strong -0.2837 0.1732 0.0766 0.1435 0.1668 -0.2722 1 0.1069 -0.2753 0.1963
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0019 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Weak -0.1733 0.1189 0.5204 -0.0373 0.5566 0.0142 0.1069 1 -0.2201 0.2665
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0019 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Overstatement 0.6000 0.1349 0.0610 0.2524 -0.1171 -0.4855 -0.2753 -0.2201 1 -0.1891
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Understatement -0.1833 0.0824 0.2740 0.0365 0.3108 -0.0585 0.1963 0.2665 -0.1891 1
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
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Table 5.3
Significant differences in word usage between lawsuit and no-lawsuit subsamples
Mean values of various word categories for 10-K reports filed by two subsamples: lawsuit firms and firms that have not
experienced a lawsuit are reported here. WC is wordcount and WPS is words per sentence. Figures for word categories
are reported in terms of a percentage of the total words contained in the document. The P-Values in the table are
associated with Wilcoxon tests for differences in the means of the word categories values between the two subsamples
and are used to indicate whether the two subsample means are significantly different from each other. Panel A lists the
subsample means for word categories in the content analysis package Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC).
Panel B lists the subsample mean values for word categories in the General Inquirer (GI) content analysis package.
Panel A: Differences in LIWC word categories
Word categories No lawsuit sample Lawsuit firm-years P-Value
WC 53766 63116 0.0006
WPS 35.5959 35.8819 0.8032
Pronoun 1.1030 1.0990 0.6231
Negate 0.6457 0.6388 0.8066
Assent 0.3931 0.4062 0.0783
Number 8.0134 7.2921 0.0000
Tentat 2.1594 2.3832 0.0033
Certain 0.5141 0.5270 0.0315
Past 1.4400 1.3948 0.0000
Present 2.8840 2.8777 0.6210
Future 1.4812 1.5639 0.0459
Achieve 0.8038 0.8077 0.4472
Allpct 33.7555 32.9462 0.9257
Negemo 0.3825 0.3919 0.1238
Posemo 2.6835 2.7074 0.6290
Optim 0.9341 0.9428 0.9931
Posfeel 0.3453 0.3551 0.1915
Panel B: Differences in GI word categories
Word categories No lawsuit sample Lawsuit firm-years P-Value
Wordcount 50930 60097 0.0006
Positive  0.0613 0.0616 0.8427
Negative 0.0214 0.0216 0.4412
Positive 2 0.0514 0.0517 0.6828
Negative 2 0.0171 0.0171 0.9977
Leftovers 0.1207 0.1195 0.7930
Strong 0.1301 0.1312 0.1412
Weak 0.0159 0.0155 0.0269
Overstatement 0.0415 0.0431 0.0084
Understatement 0.0080 0.0080 0.8590
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Table 5.4
Significant differences in mean values of principal components between lawsuit and no-
lawsuit subsamples
Mean values of various principal components based on word categories in GI and LIWC, calculated for 10-K reports
filed by two subsamples: lawsuit firms and firms which have not experienced lawsuits, are reported here. The P-Values
given in the table are associated with Wilcoxon tests for differences in the means of the variable between the two
subsamples and are used to indicate whether the two subsample means are significantly different from each other. More
details about these principal componetns and their constituents are in Table 5.6.
Principal Component No lawsuit sample Lawsuit firm-years P-Value 
PC1 Wordcount 4704 11284 0.0028 
PC2 Punctuation 0.9922 1.5602 0.0676 
PC3 Wordiness -0.1000 -0.7194 0.0161 
PC4 Informativeness 0.4297 -0.0898 0.0047 
PC5 Intangibles -0.1549 0.1510 0.0004 
PC6 Factual references 0.3042 0.1783 0.0023 
PC7 Predictive words 0.2447 0.1723 0.0265 
PC8 Positive -0.0552 -0.1060 0.4410 
PC9 Small words and 
numbers -0.0839 -0.2008 0.0003 
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Table 5.5
Unconditional logistic regressions of lawsuits on word categories
The table reports the results of unconditional logistic regressions in which the dependent variable is a binary-valued lawsuit variable that takes the value of 1 if a lawsuit
has occurred for that firm-year observation and 0 otherwise. Results are reported for four different regression specifications. For each regression, the coefficient, P-Value
and marginal effect are all reported. The regressions include word categories from the content analysis packages Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) and the
General Inquirer (GI). The regressions also include controls for size and profitability (logged market capitalization and logged ROE respectively). Controls for future and
past profitability and stock returns are included as possible determinants of legal action. Since earlier tests have shown that strong monitoring is negatively related to
litigation, I also include controls for the existence of a blockholder and the percentage of independent directors on the board. LIWC and GI word categories are indexed
as such. LIWC_WC is a control for the total number of words in the document. Other LIWC word categories used are negative emotions, positive emotions, pronouns,
numbers, tentative words, past, present and future words. GI word categories in the regressions are positive words, negative words, strong and weak words,
overstatement and understatement.
Dep. Var: Suit Coeff. P-Value M.Eff. Coeff. P-Value M.Eff. Coeff. P-Value M.Eff. Coeff. P-Value M.Eff.
I II III IV
Intercept -0.2787 <.0001 -0.3 <.0001
-
0.3213 <.0001 -0.3058 <.0001
Ln(Marketcap) 0.0149 <.0001 0.3824 0.0146 <.0001 0.0074 0.0146 <.0001 -0.0535 0.0146 <.0001 -0.0103
Ln(ROE) -0.0018 0.8705 -0.0001
-
0.0018 0.8714 0.0000
-
0.0032 0.7732 0.0000 -0.0019 0.8647 0.0000
Restatement 0.2361 <.0001 0.0000 0.2345 <.0001 0.0000 0.2356 <.0001 0.0000 0.2347 <.0001 0.0000
Future
Ln(ROE) -0.0309 0.0034 -0.0001
-
0.0302 0.0042 0.0000 -0.031 0.0034 0.0000 -0.0295 0.0049 0.0000
Lag Ln(ROE) 0.0075 0.3426 0.0002 0.0078 0.3246 0.0000 0.0063 0.4304 0.0000 0.0072 0.3614 0.0000
Fisc.yr. returns -0.0461 <.0001 -0.0016
-
0.0459 <.0001 0.0000
-
0.0458 <.0001 0.0002 -0.0453 <.0001 0.0000
Blockholder 0.0095 0.1148 0.0137 0.0086 0.1536 0.0003 0.0088 0.1394 -0.0019 0.0077 0.1942 -0.0004
PC Indep Dirs 0.0205 0.0749 0.0125 0.0232 0.0415 0.0002 0.021 0.0669 -0.0017 0.0251 0.0307 -0.0003
LIWC_WC 0.0075 0.0225 0.0011 0.007 0.0564 0.0000 0.0076 0.0358 0.0000
LIWC_Pronoun 0.0049 0.1696 0.0000
LIWC_Negemo 0.0045 0.0423 0.0013 0.0038 0.0909 0.0000
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LIWC_Posemo -0.0027 0.4906 -0.0003
-
0.0017 0.5641 0.0000
LIWC_Number -0.012 0.0012 0.0000 -0.0118 0.0018 0.0000
LIWC_Tentat
-
0.0083 0.1202 0.0000 -0.0041 0.5413 0.0000
LIWC_Past
-
0.0061 0.0205 0.0000 -0.0044 0.1073 0.0000
LIWC_Present 0.0013 0.5912 0.0000 0.0002 0.9433 0.0000
Dep. Var: Suit Coeff. P-Value M.Eff. Coeff. P-Value M.Eff. Coeff. P-Value M.Eff. Coeff. P-Value M.Eff.
I II III IV
LIWC_Future
-
0.0057 0.138 0.0000 -0.0053 0.1935 0.0000
GI_Wordcount 0.0001 0.0052 -118.834
GI_Positiv 0.002 0.4426 0.0000 0.0013 0.6316 0.0000
GI_Negativ 0.0052 0.0445 0.0002 0.0047 0.0648 0.0000
GI_Strong 0.006 0.0222 0.0000 0.0053 0.0468 0.0000
GI_Weak
-
0.0054 0.0279 0.0002 -0.0042 0.0701 0.0000
GI_Ovrst -0.002 0.5219 0.0000 -0.0021 0.6254 0.0000
GI_Undrst 1.3057 0.3103 0.0000 0.7505 0.5712 0.0000
Table 5.5, cont.
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Table 5.6
Conditional logistic regressions of lawsuits on word categories
Regressions in Table 5.5 are re-estimated using a Chamberlain conditional logit approach in order to control for
multiple observations through time for each firm in the sample. The dependent variable is a binary-valued lawsuit
variable that takes the value of 1 if a lawsuit has occurred for that firm-year observation and 0 otherwise. Results are
reported for four different regression specifications. The regressions include word categories from the content analysis
packages Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) and the General Inquirer (GI). LIWC and GI word categories are
indexed as such. The regression includes controls for size and profitability (logged market capitalization and logged
ROE respectively). Controls for future and past profitability and stock returns are also included as possible
determinants of legal action. Since earlier tests have shown that strong monitoring is negatively related to litigation, I
also include controls for the existence of a blockholder and the percentage of independent directors on the board.
LIWC_WC is a control for the total number of words in the document and LIWC_WPS is the number of words per
sentence in the document. Other LIWC word categories used are negative emotions, positive emotions, pronouns,
numbers, tentative words, certain words, past, present and future words. GI word categories in the regressions are
positive words, negative words, strong and weak words, overstatement and understatement.
Dep.Var: Suit Coefficient 
P-
Value Coefficient 
P-
Value Coefficient 
P-
Value Coefficient 
P-
Value 
Ln(Size) 0.9218 <.0001 0.9161 <.0001 0.9248 <.0001 0.9322 <.0001 
Ln(ROE) 0.2619 0.5507 0.1801 0.6795 0.2111 0.6116 0.124 0.7781 
Restatement 1.5449 0.008 1.5006 0.0125 1.4442 0.0137 1.4691 0.0139 
Future Ln(ROE) -0.0569 0.832 -0.0795 0.767 -0.0332 0.9019 -0.0618 0.8209 
Lag Ln(ROE) 1.6608 0.0336 1.5988 0.0393 1.6055 0.0365 1.612 0.0408 
F. yr. return -0.8863 <.0001 -0.8787 <.0001 -0.8626 <.0001 -0.9062 <.0001 
Blockholder -0.2331 0.4334 -0.1765 0.5523 -0.2787 0.3441 -0.1794 0.55 
Pc indep. 
Directors -1.4298 0.1441 -1.4296 0.1487 -1.3256 0.1741 -1.4262 0.1534 
LIWC_WC 0.1324 0.0224 0.1156 0.0323  0.1177 0.0223
LIWC_WPS -0.0942 0.5323 -0.0412 0.8448 -0.042 0.8449 
LIWC_Negemo -0.0463 0.8046 -0.163 0.4259 -0.0253 0.9202 
LIWC_Posemo -0.0261 0.9095 -0.2536 0.1838 -0.221 0.3228 
LIWC_Pronoun  -0.2184 0.2323
LIWC_Number -0.0547 0.0285 -0.074 0.0172 
LIWC_Tentat  0.0402 0.9009  0.1939 0.646 
LIWC_Certain  0.1885 0.2626  0.1618 0.3656 
LIWC_Past  -0.0729 0.0631  -0.0613 0.0399 
LIWC_Present  0.1718 0.3024  0.1629 0.3491 
LIWC_Future  -0.2564 0.0269  -0.2991 0.0219 
GI_Wordcount  2.77E-06 0.3295
GI_Positive 0.1117 0.4627 -0.0393 0.8534 
GI_Negative  -0.0168 0.9187 -0.0808 0.6882 
GI_Strong  0.2013 0.0306 0.1461 0.0493 
GI_Weak  -0.1974 0.026 -0.1016 0.0582 
GI_Ovrst 0.0435 0.8339 -0.0459 0.8898 
GI_Undrst 15.2869 0.8762 -0.0017 0.998 
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Table 5.7
Description of principal components
The following are the descriptions of the main principal components used in the analysis, along with their constitutent
word categories. The names of the components are descriptive and have been assigned based on the categories that
comprise them. Figure 5.1 is a scree plot that details the eigen values of the principal components.
Principal Components Name of component Constituent categories
1 Document length Wordcount from GI and LIWC 
2 Punctuation Punctuation
3 Wordiness  Words per sentence 
4 Informativeness Unique words and Numbers, (-) Tentative words 
5 Intangibles Unique words, - Numbers 
6 Factual references Articles, (-) Pronouns 
7 Predictive words Tentative words, Future words, Numbers 
8 Positive words Positive emotional words, Optimistic words, Affecting words 
9 Small words and numbers Prepositions, Pronouns, Numbers 
Table 5.8 
Summary statistics related to principal components 
Summary statistics regarding each of the 11 principal components with the highest eigen values are listed here. These
principal components were extracted from the scores of the 10-K documents along various dimensions of the LIWC
and GI word categories. The selected 11 principal components together explain more than 95 percent of the variation in
the 10-K documents.
Component Min Max  Mean Standard Deviation Eigen value Cum. variance explained 
Component 1 -15.9494 15.1663 0.0367 3.3458 10.7261 0.3462 
Component 2 -25.0438 10.4475 -0.2549 2.0648 4.2034 0.4818 
Component 3 -9.7061 18.8293 -0.0352 2.0025 3.7645 0.6033 
Component 4 -8.9640 16.9181 -0.0651 1.7396 2.7296 0.6914 
Component 5 -5.2992 20.6272 0.0788 1.4808 1.9355 0.7539 
Component 6 -21.6371 5.0476 0.1396 1.3624 1.5919 0.8052 
Component 7 -7.4798 14.1618 -0.0654 1.2631 1.3319 0.8482 
Component 8 -7.0508 36.4893 -0.0530 1.0737 0.9565 0.8791 
Component 9 -26.0591 35.7533 0.0838 1.0417 0.8872 0.9077 
Component 10 -10.8770 18.6697 -0.0490 1.0979 0.8408 0.9349 
Component 11 -22.4828 67.4228 0.0008 1.0348 0.6402 0.9555 
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Table 5.9
Conditional logistic regressions of lawsuits on principal components
Results from a Chamberlain conditional logit model in which the occurrence of a lawsuit is regressed on determinants
of a lawsuit and principal components of the characteristics of an annual report, are reported here. I regress this lawsuit
variable on all the different principal components 1 through 12, and controls for the determinants of a lawsuit and
monitoring variables. Controls include logged size, present, past and future logged profitability, and the occurrence of a
restatement. Controls for monitoring by institutions, blockholders and independent directors on the board of directors
are also included. Blockholder is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if there exists at least one institutional
blockholder holding 5% or more of the shares. The institutional holdings variable represents the proportion of shares
held by institutions and PC Indep. Dirs. represents the percentage of independent directors on the board of the
company.
Dep. Var: Suit Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Ln(Size) 0.5199 <.0001 0.5491 <.0001 0.7273 0.0004 0.7534 <.0001 
Ln(ROE) -0.1706 0.3694 -0.116 0.5377 -0.2087 0.5835 -0.0387 0.9203 
Restatement 2.1307 <.0001 1.8699 <.0001 2.2873 0.0039 1.653 0.0042 
Future 
Ln(ROE) -0.3311 0.0102 -0.3239 0.0104 -0.3732 0.0799 -0.3457 0.1028 
Lag Ln(ROE) 0.7186 0.004 0.6751 0.0044 1.4328 0.035 1.6294 0.0155 
Inst. Holdings 0.4848 0.3463   -0.0085 0.9934   
Blockholder   0.2835 0.1191   0.2708 0.3323 
PC Indep. 
Dirs.     -1.3232 0.202 -0.892 0.3138 
Component1   0.0000 0.0749 0.0000 0.2265 0.0000 0.1213 
Component2   0.0226 0.0054 0.0089 0.4871 0.0134 0.2385 
Component3   -0.0114 0.4742 -0.0091 0.7011 -0.0214 0.3950 
Component4 -0.0295 0.0334 -0.0929 0.0314 -0.0121 0.0851 -0.0488 0.0446 
Component5   -0.0580 0.3200 -0.0951 0.3036 -0.1667 0.0579 
Component6   0.1205 0.2180 -0.0444 0.8039 0.0884 0.5804 
Component7   -0.2700 0.0243 -0.2565 0.0253 -0.2918 0.1073 
Component8   0.0178 0.8795 0.1463 0.3709 0.1045 0.4893 
Component9   -0.0452 0.7317 -0.0657 0.7588 0.0612 0.7611 
Component10   0.0542 0.7648 0.1006 0.7236 -0.0310 0.9053 
Component11   -0.3831 0.0537 -0.6683 0.0333 -0.3779 0.1653 
Component12   0.1336 0.5978 0.6549 0.1106 0.5450 0.1351 
N 24266   24266   24266   24266   
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Table 5.10
Correlation coefficients of principal components and S&P ranks with lawsuits
The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients and the P-Values representing the statistical significance of these correlation coefficients, between three selected
principal components and two S&P transparency and disclosure rankings. The principal components selected for this analysis are wordcount, informativeness and
forward-looking words, which are component 1, 4 and 7 respectively. The S&P awards a composite rank based on firm-level information and an AR rank based on
annual report data only. These ranks represent the extent of transparency and good disclosure practices in the company. A high transparency and disclosure rank
represents a company with higher transparency and better disclosure. Though the AR rank and the composite rank are correlated with each other, they are not correlated
with the informativeness and the forward looking principal components. Neither of the S&P ranks is significantly correlated with the occurrence of a lawsuit. However
both informative and forward-looking disclosure are negatively correlated with lawsuits. Wordcount is positively correlated with lawsuits. P-Values for the correlation
coefficients are in italics below the coefficient.
AR Rank
Composite
rank Suit PC4 Informativeness
PC7 Forward
looking
PC1
Wordcount
AR Rank 1 0.3761 0.0371 0.0680 0.0234 -0.0503
<.0001 0.477 0.1918 0.6533 0.3346
CompositeRank 0.3761 1 0.0001 0.0539 0.0286 0.0720
<.0001 0.998 0.3007 0.5834 0.1672
Suit 0.0371 0.0001 1 -0.1088 0.0411 0.0494
0.477 0.998 <.0001 0.0029 0.0003
PC4
Informativeness 0.0680 0.0539 -0.1088 1 -0.0723 0.0147
0.1918 0.3007 <.0001 <.0001 0.2879
PC7 Forward
looking 0.0234 0.0286 0.0411 -0.0723 1 -0.0098
0.6533 0.5834 0.0029 <.0001 0.4752
PC1 Wordcount -0.0503 0.0719 0.0494 0.0146 -0.0098 1
0.3346 0.1672 0.0003 0.2879 0.4752
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Table 5.11
Comparison of informativeness component with S&P Transparency and Disclosure rank
Results from a horse race between the Principal Component 4 or Informativeness, and the S&P Transparency and
Disclosure ranks are reported here. The S&P Transparency and Disclosure rank comes with an overall assessment
called the Composite rank and an assessment based on disclosure in annual reports, called the AR rank. This table
compares the ability of the S&P ranks and the principal components to predict litigation, and hence the dependent
variable here is the occurrence of a lawsuit. This is a binary-valued discrete choice variable. Controls include other
common determinants of lawsuits, and monitoring variables such as the existence of a blockholder and the proportion
of independent directors on the board. Components 1 through 9 are the principal components based on content analysis
of word categories. For a description of these principal components or their constituent word categories, please see
Tables 5.7 and 5.8.
Dep. Var: Suit Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept -14.0047 <.0001 -15.941 0.0002  -11.1675 <.0001 
Ln(Size) 0.3477 0.0018 0.4027 0.0011 0.3735 <.0001 
Ln(ROE) -0.1127 0.7139 2.0991 <.0001 0.9898 0.0732 
Restatement 1.946 <.0001 -0.117 0.7068 -1.1579 <.0001 
Fisc. Year 
returns -1.5096 <.0001 -1.5703 <.0001 -0.3542 0.0256 
Blockholder 1.2953 0.0448 1.8989 0.073 0.1294 0.5082 
PC Indep. Dirs 1.3796 0.0762 1.3318 0.0831 1.9277 <.0001 
Composite Rank 0.0813 0.6992 0.1008 0.6427 
AR Rank 0.0617 0.3373 
Component1 -0.0139 0.7056  0.0614 0.007 
Component2  0.1996 <.0001 
Component3 -0.0223 0.5547 
Component4 -0.1809 0.0113 -0.1907 0.0117 -0.0711 0.0677 
Component5  0.1801 0.0007 
Component6 -0.027 0.6576 
Component7 -0.1665 0.2281  -0.0711 0.2505 
Component8 -0.1998 0.0243 
Component9 -0.1998 0.0212 
116
Table 6.1
Determinants of informativeness: Governance structures
The table reports the results from a regression in which the dependent variable is the value of the informativeness principal component for a given 10-K document of a company.
The value of informativeness is determined from a principal component analysis of the loadings of a 10-K document among various word categories. The independent variables are
financial and monitoring characteristics of the company. The G-Index of antitakeover defenses and the E-Index or entrenchment index are used as independent variables in the
regression. Compensation variables such as the total pay and the incentive-based compensation of the CEO are also included. Financial characteristics include size, current
profitability, lagged and future profitability and lagged stock returns. The document length is also included as it may be related to informativeness of the document as well. The
regression includes controls for year and industry effects and standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering.
Coefficient
P-
Value Coefficient
P-
Value Coefficient
P-
Value Coefficient
P-
Value Coefficient
P-
Value Coefficient P-Value
Intercept 0.1417 0.7587 0.2094 0.6506 0.5752 0.2116 -0.0992 0.8329 0.2233 0.6559 1.1386 0.0383
Restatement 0.1556 0.4387 0.1687 0.404 0.3585 0.1 0.2125 0.4142 0.5009 0.0637 0.4166 0.5749
Ln(Marketcap) -0.0182 0.4299 -0.0155 0.5052 -0.0411 0.0816 0.0125 0.5852 -0.0298 0.256 -0.0375 0.1912
Ln(ROE) -0.6252 <.0001 -0.6444 <.0001 -0.5515 <.0001 -0.642 <.0001 -0.5074 <.0001 -0.9426 <.0001
Fwd LnROE 0.0183 0.7657 0.0198 0.7427 0.0669 0.2591 -0.0676 0.3181 -0.0262 0.6987 0.1297 0.1498
Fisc yr return -0.1182 0.0016 -0.1172 0.002 -0.1073 0.0052 -0.1553 <.0001 -0.1388 0.0016 -0.13 0.0449
Lag LnROE -0.5669 <.0001 -0.5653 <.0001 -0.4752 <.0001 -0.6229 <.0001 -0.524 <.0001 -0.3339 0.0037
Disc. Accruals -0.0001 0.0005 0 0.0078 -0.0001 0.1784
Document
length(PC1) -0.0279 0.0006 -0.0063 0.4433 -0.0272 0.0018 -0.0103 0.2438 -0.0092 0.387
PC Indep Dirs 0.3371 0.0529 0.4247 0.0177 0.3829 0.0301 0.5179 0.0077 0.3831 0.0833
Total Dirs. 0.0143 0.202 0.0188 0.1028 0.0337 0.0149 0.0315 0.0283 0.046 0.0053
G-Index -0.0249 0.0535 -0.0207 0.0852 -0.0169 0.1906
E-Index -0.0679 0.0208
Total pay CEO 1.825 0.1533 1.7994 0.1721
Incentive pay CEO -0.0353 0.6938 0.0353 0.7022
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FF industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster adjusted SEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
117
Table 6.2
Monitoring structures as determinants of informativeness: Two stage least squares
regression
This table shows the results of a Two-Stage Least Squares regression in which membership in the S&P index is used as
an instrument for institutional monitoring. This instrument is used to do logistic regressions of the occurrence of a
lawsuit on the institutional monitoring variable. First and second stage regression results are given in Panel A and B
respectively. The three first stage regressions have as a dependent variable the proportion of shares held by institutions,
the existence of a blockholder, and the number of block holders respectively. In all these three regressions, the
dependent variable is S&P index membership and the coefficients in the table are the coefficients on this variable. P-
Values and the adjusted R-squared are also displayed. In the second stage regressions, the informativeness measure is
the dependent variable and the various independent variables are listed in the table.
First stage regression estimates 
Indep. Var. Dep. Var.  Coefficient P-Value 
S&P Index Prop. Institutional holdings 0.0368 0.0159 
S&P Index Blockholder 0.1537 <.0001 
S&P Index # Block holders 0.9864 <.0001 
Coefficient 
P-
Value   Coefficient 
P-
Value   Coefficient 
P-
Value   Coefficient 
P-
Value 
Intercept -0.4272 0.0004 -0.4986 <.0001 -0.6015 <.0001 -1.3000 <.0001 
Restatement 0.0550 0.6022 0.0010 0.9922 0.0002 0.9436 0.0060 0.0944 
Ln(Marketcap) -0.0239 0.0003 -0.0323 <.0001 -0.0136 0.043 0.0233 0.0045 
Ln(ROE) -0.1385 <.0001 -0.1708 <.0001 -0.3668 <.0001 -0.4183 <.0001 
Future LnROE 0.0162 0.6254  0.0525 0.1982 
Lag LnROE -0.1531 <.0001  -0.1701 <.0001 
Institutional 
holdings 0.5476 <.0001
Blockholder 0.5865 0.0002  
# Blockholders  0.0615 0.0316
Analyst 
coverage 0.0279 0.0056 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FF industry 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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